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  Daniel	  Matthews	  Assistant	  Professor	  of	  Law	  University	  of	  Hong	  Kong	  	  	  	  PLASTICITY,	  JURISDICTION	  AND	  THE	  INTERRUPTION	  OF	  SOVEREIGNTY:	  A	  RESPONSE	  TO	  CATHERINE	  MALABOU	  VIA	  JOSÉ	  SARAMAGO’S	  SEEING	  	  	  This	  is	  not	  a	  place	  of	  words…	  This	  is	  a	  place	  where	  bodies	  are	  their	  own	  signs	  (J.	  M.	  Coetzee)1	  	  	  	  
Introduction	  Some	   years	   ago,	   Hilary	   Mantel	   caused	   much	   consternation	   in	   certain	   corners	   of	   the	  British	   press	   when	   she	   described	   Kate	   Middleton	   –	   the	   Duchess	   of	   Cambridge	   –	   as	  appearing	   committee-­‐designed	   and	   machine-­‐made,	   in	   possession	   of	   nothing	   but	   a	  plastic	  smile	  and	  a	  doll’s	  jointed-­‐limbs	  on	  which	  ‘certain	  frocks	  could	  be	  hung’.2	  Writing	  at	  a	  time	  before	  the	  birth	  of	  her	  children,	  before	  the	  royal	  line	  had	  been	  secured,	  Mantel	  presents	   Middleton	   as	   uncannily	   doubled:	   eerily	   lifeless,	   little	   more	   than	   a	   shop	  mannequin,	   dead	   behind	   the	   eyes	   and	   utterly	   content-­‐less,	   she	   appears	   to	   be	   defined	  only	   by	   the	   clothes	   she	   wears.	   But	   another	   life	   inheres	   this	   automaton.	   At	   the	   time	  Mantel	  was	  writing,	  the	  Duchess	  was	  the	  mother-­‐to-­‐be	  of	  the	  sovereign-­‐to-­‐be,	  the	  most	  vital	  of	  all	  the	  royals.	  Middleton	  is	  ‘breeding	  stock…	  a	  collection	  of	  organs’	  	  that	  will	  give	  life	  to	  the	  next	  monarch.3	  This	  dual	  life	  as	  both	  national-­‐zombie	  and	  national-­‐procreator	  is	   a	   striking	   image	   and	  with	   it	  Mantel	   presents	  Middleton’s	   ‘two	  bodies’,	   a	   bifurcation	  between	  symbolic	  and	  biological	  life	  that	  has	  haunted	  depictions	  of	  royalty	  for	  centuries.	  	  	  This	   binary	  was	  once	   thought	   to	   be	   the	   exclusive	  preserve	  of	   the	  monarch;	   a	   division	  between	   the	   body	   ‘politic’	   and	   body	   ‘natural’	   famously	   examined	   in	   Kantorowitz’s	  seminal	   study	   of	   medieval	   kingship.4	  As	   Eric	   Satner	   has	   compellingly	   argued,	   the	  modern	  transfer	  from	  monarchical	  to	  popular	  sovereignty	  suggests	  that	  we	  are	  all	  now	  left	   grappling	  with	   an	   uncanny	   ‘symbolic’	   remainder,	   a	   poetic	   excess	   to	   our	   biological	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  J.	  M.	  Coetzee,	  Foe	  (London:	  Vintage,	  2010),	  157.	  2	  Hilary	  Mantel,	  ‘Royal	  Bodies’	  London	  Review	  of	  Books	  (2013)	  35(4),	  3.	  3	  Ibid.	  4	  Ernst	  Kantorowitz,	  The	  King’s	  Two	  Bodies:	  A	  Study	  in	  Medieval	  Political	  Theology	  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1997).	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reality.5	  If	  Satner	  is	  right	  and	  the	  ‘king’s	  two	  bodies’	  is	  now	  a	  matter	  for	  the	  citizenry	  at	  large,	   the	   following	   account	   of	  Mantel’s	   encounter	  with	   the	   Queen	   speaks	   as	  much	   of	  Mantel’s	  own	  ‘life’	  as	  it	  does	  the	  sovereign’s:	  	  such	  was	  the	  hard	  power	  of	  my	  stare	  that	  Her	  Majesty	  turned	  and	  looked	  back	  at	  me,	  as	  if	   she	   had	   been	   jabbed	   in	   the	   shoulder;	   and	   for	   a	   split	   second	   her	   face	   expressed	   not	  anger	  but	  hurt	  bewilderment.	  She	  looked	  young:	  for	  a	  moment	  she	  had	  turned	  back	  from	  a	  figurehead	  into	  the	  young	  woman	  she	  was	  before	  monarchy	  froze	  her	  and	  made	  her	  a	  thing,	  a	  thing	  which	  only	  had	  meaning	  when	  it	  was	  exposed,	  a	  thing	  that	  existed	  only	  to	  be	  looked	  at.6	  In	  an	  ironic	  reversal	  of	  the	  biopolitical	  paradigm,	  it	  is	  the	  symbolic	  rather	  than	  biological	  body	   that	   reifies	   Elizabeth,	   transforming	  her	   into	   an	   object	   simply	   to	   be	   observed.	   As	  Foucault	   describes	   it,	   the	   capacity	   to	   transform	   citizens	   into	   ‘things’	   that	   can	   be	  managed	  and	  measured	  is	  a	  product	  of	  the	  biological	  sciences	  that,	  since	  the	  eighteenth	  century,	  have	  given	  rise	  to	  a	  suite	  of	  new	  disciplines	  that	  augured	  a	  new	  form	  of	  political	  control.	  The	  discovery	  of	   ‘life’	  as	  something	  measurable,	  programmed	  and	  determined	  gave	   birth	   to	   the	   biopolitical	   age.7	  And	   following	   Agamben,	   we	   can	   claim	   that	   the	  biological/symbolic	   division	   has	   a	   longer	   history	   still,	   stretching	   back	   to	   Aristotle’s	  efforts	   to	   delimit	   the	   political	   by	   reference	   to	   bios,	   that	   form	   of	   life	   that	   exceeds	   the	  unqualified	   ‘life’	   of	   zoe.8	  The	   striking	   image	   that	  Mantel	   gives	   us,	   then,	   of	   a	   bifurcated	  Duchess	  presents	  us	  with	  a	  form	  of	  life	  –	  at	  once	  biological	  and	  more	  than	  the	  biological	  –	  that	   has	   animated	   the	  political	   history	   of	   the	  West.	   For	  Kantorowitz,	   as	  much	   as	   for	  Foucault	  and	  Agamben,	  this	  division	  is	  central	  to	  the	  theorisation	  of	  sovereignty.	  It	  is	  the	  significance	   and	   tenability	   of	   this	   conception	   of	   a	   ‘doubled	   life’	   that	   gives	   rise	   to	  sovereignty	  that	  is	  my	  focus	  in	  what	  follows.	  	  	  In	   a	   series	   of	   recent	   essays,	   Catherine	  Malabou	   proposes	   possibilities	   for	   overcoming	  this	   account	   of	   ‘life’.9 	  Malabou’s	   innovative	   philosophical	   project	   draws	   on	   Hegel,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Eric	  Satner,	  The	  Royal	  Remains:	  The	  People’s	  Two	  Bodies	  and	  the	  Endgames	  of	  Sovereignty	  (Chicago:	  Chicago	  University	  Press,	  2011).	  6	  Mantel,	  ‘Royal	  Bodies’,	  6.	  7	  See	  Michel	  Foucault,	  The	  History	  of	  Sexuality	  Vol.	  1:	  The	  Will	  to	  Knowledge	  (London:	  Penguin,	  1998)	  and	  Michel	  Foucault,	  The	  Birth	  of	  Biopolitics:	  Lectures	  at	  the	  College	  de	  France	  1978-­‐1979	  (Basingstoke:	  Palgrave	  Macmillan,	  2010).	  	  8	  Giorgio	  Agamben,	  Homo	  Sacer:	  Sovereign	  Power	  and	  Bare	  Life	  (Stanford:	  Stanford	  University	  Press,	  1998).	  9	  Catherine	  Malabou,	  ‘Will	  Sovereignty	  Ever	  be	  Deconstructed?’	  in	  Bhandar	  and	  Goldberg-­‐Hiller	  eds.,	  Plastic	  Materialities:	  Politics,	  Legality	  and	  Metamorphosis	  in	  the	  work	  of	  Catherine	  Malabou	  (Padstow:	  Duke	  University	  Press,	  2015),	  35-­‐45;	  Catherine	  Malabou,	  ‘The	  King’s	  Two	  (Biopolitical)	  Bodies’	  Representations	  (Summer	  2014)	  127(1),	  98-­‐106;	  Catherine	  Malabou,	  ‘One	  Life	  Only:	  Biological	  Resistance,	  Political	  Resistance’	  Critical	  Inquiry	  (2015),	  ISSN	  (online)	  1539-­‐7858,	  accessed	  March	  2016.	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Heidegger,	   Derrida	   and	   –	   less	   conventionally	   –	   contemporary	   biological	   science,	  particularly	  epi-­‐genetics.	  Malabou	  is	  not	  an	  expressly	   ‘political’,	  and	  much	  less	  a	   ‘legal’,	  philosopher	  but	  her	   recent	   interventions	  on	  sovereignty	  engage	  one	  of	   the	  most	  hotly	  debated	   areas	   in	   legal	   and	   political	   thought	   and	   are	   therefore	   worthy	   of	   careful	  examination	  in	  this	  context.	  Pursuing	  what	  she	  calls	  a	   ‘plastic	  reading’	  of	  sovereignty10	  Malabou	   argues	   that	   celebrated	   ‘deconstructions’	   of	   the	   concept	   offered	   by	   Agamben,	  Derrida	  and	  Foucault	  have	  all	  failed	  to	  transcend	  the	  division	  between	  the	  biological	  and	  symbolic	  that	  constitutes	  sovereignty.	  Malabou	  argues	  that	  by	  insisting	  on	  a	  dimension	  to	   life	   that	   is	   irreducible	   to	   the	  biological,	  Agamben	  et	  al	  in	   fact	  manage	   to	   re-­‐inscribe	  the	   very	   structure	   of	   the	   concept	   that	   they	   seek	   to	   deconstruct.	   In	   short,	   the	   division	  between	  biological	  and	  symbolic	  life,	  that	  uncannily	  doubled	  life	  that	  Mantel	  encounters	  in	   Middleton,	   remains	   operative	   within	   their	   efforts	   to	   move	   beyond	   sovereignty.	  Malabou	  engages	  recent	  developments	  in	  epigenetics	  to	  revise	  the	  reductive	  account	  of	  biology	  on	  which	  these	  three	  thinkers	  rely	  and	  seeks,	  paradoxical	  though	  it	  may	  seem,	  to	  develop	   ‘a	   biological	   resistance	   to	   biopolitics’. 11 	  In	   reimagining	   ‘life’	   beyond	   the	  biological/symbolic	  binary,	  Malabou	  suggests	   that	  we	  can	  glimpse	  a	   life	  –	  and	  hence	  a	  form	  of	  politics	  –	  beyond	  sovereignty.	  	  	  In	   her	   recent	   interventions,	   Malabou	   follows	   Foucault	   in	   insisting	   that	   the	   ‘juridical	  structure’	  of	  sovereignty	  must	  be	  superseded.	  Despite	  the	  transformation	  of	  sovereignty	  from	  a	  ‘monarchical’	  to	  a	  putatively	  ‘popular’	  form	  in	  the	  West,	  the	  enduring	  force	  of	  this	  political	   form	   is	   explicable	   through	   the	   sovereignty	   of	   democratic	   institutions	   that	  ensure	  that	  state	   law	  is	  the	  only	  expression	  of	  authority.12	  But	  having	  underscored	  the	  significance	   of	   the	   juridical,	   Malabou	   does	   not	   return	   to	   it;	   indeed,	   her	   discussion	   of	  sovereignty	  pays	  no	   attention	   to	   the	   juridical	   techniques	   implicated	   in	   the	  production	  and	   maintenance	   of	   sovereignty.	   In	   this	   article	   I	   argue	   that	   we	   need	   to	   approach	  sovereignty	   not	   only	   through	   an	   interrogation	   of	   the	   politico-­‐biological	   nexus	   (as	  Malabou	   does)	   but	   also	   the	   politico-­‐juridical	   one.	   I	   seek	   to	   supplement	   Malabou’s	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  In	  brief,	  a	  ‘plastic	  reading’	  focuses	  on	  the	  form	  of	  a	  	  concept	  or	  text	  that	  is	  left	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  its	  deconstruction.	  Drawing	  on	  neuroscience,	  Hegelian	  dialects,	  Heidegger’s	  Destruksion	  and	  Derridian	  deconstruction,	  Malabou’s	  philosophical	  project	  seeks	  to	  develop	  an	  innovative	  hermeneutics	  that,	  whilst	  indebted	  to	  these	  approaches,	  moves	  beyond	  them	  by	  foregrounding	  a	  materialist	  attention	  to	  form.	  	  Malabou’s	  work	  is	  not	  well	  known	  within	  legal	  studies.	  However,	  a	  recent	  collection	  of	  essays	  examines	  Malabou’s	  thinking	  of	  plasticity	  specifically	  in	  relation	  to	  politics	  and	  law;	  see,	  Bhandar	  and	  Goldberg-­‐Hiller	  eds.,	  Plastic	  Materialities:	  Politics,	  Legality	  and	  
Metamorphosis	  in	  the	  work	  of	  Catherine	  Malabou	  (Padstow:	  Duke	  University	  Press,	  2015).	  For	  a	  more	  general,	  autobiographical	  account	  see	  Catherine	  Malabou,	  Plasticity	  at	  the	  Dusk	  of	  Writing	  (New	  York:	  Columbia	  University	  Press,	  2010).	  	  11	  Malabou,	  ‘One	  Life	  Only’.	  12	  Malabou,	  ‘Will	  Sovereignty	  Ever	  Be	  Deconstructed’,	  35-­‐36.	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account	  of	  sovereignty	  by	  pursuing	  a	  ‘plastic	  reading’	  of	  sovereignty	  within	  the	  juridical	  not	   the	  biological	  domain.	   I	  do	   this	  by	  examining	   two	   ‘jurisdictional	   technologies’	   that	  give	  form	  to	  sovereignty.	   I	  argue	  that	  without	  an	  account	  of	  these	   juridical	  techniques,	  Malabou’s	  critical	  reading	  of	  sovereignty	  remains	  impoverished.	  As	  I	  set	  out	  below,	  it	  is	  precisely	   the	   techniques	   of	   jurisdiction	   that	   are	   implicated	   in	   the	   production	   of	   the	  division	  between	  the	  symbolic	  and	  the	  biological	  that	  so	  animates	  Malabou.	  	  	  By	   seeking	   to	   transcend	   the	   division	   between	   the	   ‘biological’	   and	   the	   ‘symbolic’,	  Malabou	  foregrounds	  a	   ‘life’	  that	  is,	  as	  our	  epigraph	  has	  it,	  always	  already	   its	  own	  sign;	  that	  is,	  a	  ‘life’	  that	  need	  not	  be	  mediated	  through	  symbolic	  forms	  that	  supposedly	  confer	  its	  value.	  My	  argument	  suggests	   that	   it	   is	  only	  by	  attending	   to	   the	   juridical	   techniques	  that	   intervene	   in	   ‘life’	   that	   we	   can	   appreciate	   how	   life,	   within	   the	   paradigm	   of	  sovereignty,	  precisely	  fails	  to	  appear	  as	  its	  own	  sign.	  I	  argue	  that	  it	  is	  law	  –	  specifically	  certain	   jurisdictional	   technologies	   discussed	   below	   –	  that	   disavow	   the	   presence	   of	   a	  singular	  ‘life’,	  insisting	  instead	  on	  the	  existence	  of	  bodies	  that	  are	  bifurcated	  between	  an	  affective,	   biological	   reality	   and	   a	   juridical	   form;	   with	   an	   uncompromising	   emphasis	  placed	  on	  the	  latter.	  The	  critical	  intervention	  that	  I	  wish	  to	  make	  through	  José	  Saramago	  re-­‐orientates	   the	   relation	   of	   ‘life’	   and	   ‘form’,	   underscoring	   how	  an	   affective,	   biological	  life	   always	   remains	   refractory	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   juridical	   forms	   that	   sovereignty	  demands	   of	   it.	   However,	   Saramago’s	   foregrounding	   of	   ‘life’	   is	   quite	   distinct	   from	  Malabou’s	  own	  efforts	   in	  this	  regard.	  Where	  cerebral	  life	  comes	  to	  dominate	  Malabou’s	  thinking,	   through	   Saramago	   we	   can	   gesture	   towards	   a	   collective	   life	   that	   interrupts	  sovereignty.	   Through	   a	   reading	   of	   the	   novel	   I	   also	   want	   to	   question	   the	   position	  articulated	  by	  Foucault,	  and	  endorsed	  by	  Malabou,	  that	  ultimately	  we	  need	  to	  transcend	  sovereignty	  tout	  court.	  In	  our	  current	  conjuncture,	  rather	  than	  ‘cut	  off	  the	  king’s	  head’	  I	  argue	   that	   we	   need	   to	   be	   somewhat	   more	   circumspect	   and	   ‘test	   the	   plasticity	   of	  sovereignty’,	  in	  ways	  that	  Saramago’s	  novel	  points	  to,	  rather	  than	  hope	  to	  do	  away	  with	  it	  once	  and	  for	  all.	  	  The	  article	  begins	  by	  briefly	  unpacking	  Malabou’s	  methodology	  of	  a	   ‘plastic	   reading’,	  a	  hermeneutic	   strategy	   that	   informs	   my	   own	   argument,	   before	   moving	   to	   assess	   some	  points	   of	   dissonance	   and	   resonance	   between	   Malabou	   and	   Agamben’s	   reading	   of	  sovereignty.	   Putting	   Malabou	   into	   conversation	   with	   Agamben	   helps	   appreciate	   the	  importance	  of	  Malabou’s	  own	  intervention.	  In	  the	  second	  section	  of	  the	  paper	  I	  engage	  with	  two	  ‘jurisdictional	  technologies’	  in	  order	  to	  re-­‐assess	  the	  relation	  between	  law,	  life	  and	  sovereignty	  before	  turning,	  in	  the	  third	  and	  final	  section,	  to	  Saramago’s	  novel.	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I	  Plasticity,	  sovereignty	  and	  form-­‐of-­‐life	  	  Malabou’s	  work	  is	  part	  of	  a	  relatively	  recent	  return	  in	  continental	  thought	  to	  a	  concern	  for	  materiality,	   objects	   and	   form.	   The	   ‘master	   concept’	   that	   orientates	  Malabou’s	   own	  materialist	   philosophical	   intervention	   is	   ‘plasticity’.	   Put	   simply,	   ‘plasticity’	   refers	   to	   a	  general	   condition	   of	   mutability	   or	   change	   in	   a	   given	   context.	   The	   focus	   of	   Malabou’s	  thought	  is	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  form	  of	  a	  given	  text	  or	  concept	  has	  an	  essentially	  plastic	  quality	   that	   itself	   testifies	   to	   a	   more	   fundamental	   ‘plastic	   ontology’	   which	   asserts	   an	  essential	   mutability	   to	   being.	   Malabou’s	   ambitious	   project	   foregrounds	   notions	   of	  change	   and	   metamorphosis	   in	   an	   effort	   to	   expose	   a	   fundamental	   plasticity	   to	   texts,	  concepts	  and,	  indeed,	  life	  itself.	  From	  Hegelian	  dialectics	  to	  Heideggerian	  Destrukion	  and	  recent	   discoveries	   in	   epi-­‐genetics,	   Malabou’s	   work	   seeks	   to	   reveals	   an	   originary	  ‘plasticity’	   inhering	  a	  series	  of	  different	  discourses.	  Beyond	  the	  specific	  arguments	  that	  Malabou	   develops	   in	   relation	   to	   Hegel,	   Heidegger,	   Derrida	   and	   beyond,	   lies	   a	   more	  fundamental	  methodological	  development	  that	  she	  describes	  as	  a	  ‘plastic	  reading’.	  This	  ‘new	   method	   of	   reading’ 13 	  amounts	   to	   a	   distinctive	   hermeneutics	   developed	   in	  conversation	  with,	  but	  clearly	  moving	  beyond,	  deconstructive	  strategies	  of	  reading	  and	  interpretation.	   The	   strategy	   of	   ‘plastic	   reading’	   animates	   the	   full	   range	   of	   Malabou’s	  interventions	  and	  is	  the	  methodology	  that	  shapes	  my	  present	  intervention;	  let	  us	  briefly	  elaborate	  this.	  	  Drawing	  on	  Derrida’s	   insistence	  that	  concepts	  are	  doubly	  marked	  from	  their	   inception	  with	   a	   metaphysical	   and	   an	   ‘ultra-­‐metaphysical’	   or	   ‘deconstructed’	   sense,	   Malabou	  suggests	   that	   a	   ‘plastic	   reading’	   examines	   how	   a	   concept	   can	   change	   form	   through	  interpretative	   and	   creative	   philosophical	   practice.	   In	   particular,	   Malabou	   seeks	   to	  account	   for	   how	   a	   given	   concept	   can	   be	   transformed	   from	   having	   a	   metaphysical	   to	  having	  a	  post-­‐metaphysical	   or	  deconstructive	   sense.	  To	  be	   clear,	   her	   aim	   is	   to	   explain	  
how,	  within	  the	  economy	  of	  a	  text	  or	  body	  of	  work,	  such	  a	  transformation	  is	  made.	  	  	  Let	  me	  give	  a	  couple	  of	  examples.	  As	  is	  well	  known,	  the	  novelty	  of	  Heidegger’s	  thought	  rests	  on	  his	  ability	  to	  shift	  the	  focus	  of	  metaphysics	  away	  from	  ‘beings’	  (the	  ontic),	  to	  an	  account	  of	  ‘Being’	  (the	  ontological).	  The	  ontology	  of	  western	  philosophy,	  Heidegger	  tells	  us,	   has	   never	   grappled	   with	   ‘Being’	   as	   such,	   instead	   it	   has	   remained	   wedded	   to	   an	  account	  of	  particular	  instantiations	  of	  Being	  in	  the	  form	  of	  objects	  in	  the	  ontic	  realm.	  In	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  Malabou,	  Plasticity	  at	  the	  Dusk	  of	  Writing,	  51	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her	  ‘plastic	  reading’	  of	  Heidegger,	  Malabou	  focuses	  on	  three	  often	  underplayed	  concepts	  in	  Heidegger’s	  oeuvre	  –	  Wandeln,	  Wandlungen	  and	  Verwandlungen	  –	  that,	  she	  claims,	  are	  crucial	  if	  we	  are	  to	  understand	  how	  Heidegger	  was	  able	  to	  transform	  metaphysics	  from	  an	   ontic	   to	   a	   truly	   ontological	   discourse.14	  What	   therefore	   concerns	   Malabou	   is	   the	  question	   of	   how	   ‘being’	   is	   transformed	   by	   Heidegger	   and	   in	   so	   doing	   she	   seeks	   to	  account	   for	   the	   fundamental	   transformability	   or	   plasticity	   of	   ‘being’,	   itself.	   Malabou	  approaches	  Derrida’s	   philosophy	   of	   ‘writing’	   in	   a	   similar	   vein.	   Derrida,	   particularly	   in	  the	  Grammatology,	   radically	   expands	   the	  meaning	  of	   ‘writing’	   (écriture),	  moving	   away	  from	  an	  everyday	  or	  ‘vulgar’	  notion	  of	  writing	  that	  refers	  to	  marks	  on	  the	  page,	  to	  refer	  to	   writing	   as	   ‘arche-­‐writing’,	   a	   generalised	   play	   of	   difference	   and	   deferral	   that	   is	   the	  condition	  of	  possibility	  for	  communication	  as	  such.	  Again,	  what	  interests	  Malabou	  here	  is	   what	   allows	   for	   this	   expansion	   of	   the	   concept	   of	   ‘writing’	   to	   take	   place.	   In	   short,	  Malabou	   argues	   that	   Derrida’s	   transformation	   of	   ‘writing’	   testifies	   to	   a	   form	   of	  mutability	   that	   is	   irreducible	   to	   arche-­‐writing	   and	  must	   be	   understood	   in	   terms	   of	   a	  generalizable	   plasticity	   of	   form.	   As	   she	   claims,	   there	   is	   at	   work	   in	   the	   economy	   of	  Derrida’s	   philosophy	   a	   ‘game	   of	   donation	   and	   reception	   of	   form	   that	   is	  more	   original	  than	   arche-­‐writing,	   that	   permits	   the	   construction	   of	   the	   concept	   of	   arche-­‐writing	  itself’.15	  This	  anterior	  malleability,	  Malabou	  names	  ‘plasticity’.	  	  	  A	  plastic	  reading,	  then,	  focuses	  on	  that	  which	  allows	  for	  transformations	  (i.e.	  changes	  in	  from)	   to	   take	   place.	   Where	   a	   deconstructive	   hermeneutics	   gestures	   towards	   an	  unforeseeable	   future	  or	  à	  venir	   for	  a	  given	   text	  or	   concept,	   a	  plastic	   reading	  examines	  how,	  as	  Malabou	  puts	   it,	   a	   text	   ‘lives	   its	  deconstruction’,	   exploring	   the	   form	   left	   in	   the	  wake	  of	  the	  withdrawal	  of	  the	  metaphysics	  of	  presence.16	  In	  this	  way,	  a	  plastic	  reading	  is	  engaged	   with	   questions	   of	   form,	   concerned	   with	   accounting	   for	   what	   both	   gives	   and	  receives	   form	   in	   a	   given	   context,	   and	   in	   examining	   the	   form	   that	   persists	   through	   a	  deconstructive	  reading	  of	  a	  text.	  As	  Malabou	  describes	  it,	  a	  plastic	  reading	  will	  reveal	  the	  form	  that	  emerges	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  a	  deconstruction.17	  	  It	   is	   this	  methodology	   of	   a	   plastic	   reading	   that	   informs	  Malabou’s	   recent	   engagement	  with	  sovereignty.	  Her	  aim	  in	  these	  essays	  is	  to	  account	  for	  that	  which	  produces	  the	  from	  of	   sovereignty,	   and	   to	   pose	   the	   question	   of	   what	   might	   remain	   in	   the	   wake	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  Catherine	  Malabou,	  The	  Heidegger	  Change:	  On	  the	  Fantastic	  in	  Philosophy	  (New	  York:	  SUNY	  Press,	  2004).	  15	  Catherine	  Malabou,	  ‘The	  End	  of	  Writing?	  Grammatology	  and	  Plasticity’	  European	  Legacy	  (2007)	  12(4),	  437.	  16	  Ibid.,	  52.	  17	  Malabou,	  Plasticity	  at	  the	  Dusk	  of	  Writing,	  51-­‐57.	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sovereignty’s	  deconstruction?	  As	  alluded	  to	  above,	  Malabou	  answers	  these	  questions	  by	  focusing	   on	   the	   conception	   of	   ‘life’	   that	   has	   been	   instrumental	   to	   Western	   political	  thought.	  It	  is	  the	  operative	  division	  between	  two	  forms	  of	  life	  (biological/symbolic)	  that	  gives	  sovereignty	  its	  form.	  And	  it	  is	  this	  very	  division	  that	  must	  be	  overcome	  if	  we	  are	  to	  abandon	   a	   politics	   still	   beholden	   to	   sovereignty	   and	   finally	   ‘cut	   off	   the	   king’s	   head’.	  Malabou’s	  plastic	  reading	  of	  sovereignty	  evokes	  a	  new	  account	  of	   life,	   life	  as	  no	   longer	  divided	  between	  a	  biological	  determination	  and	  a	  political	  qualification,	  but	  a	   ‘life’	   into	  which	   the	   symbolic	   and	   biological	   collapse.	   It	   is	   this	   account	   of	   ‘life’	   that	   ‘lives’	   the	  deconstruction	  of	  sovereignty.	  	  	  Centrally	   important	   for	   Malabou	   is	   the	   need	   to	   challenge	   a	   form	   of	   ‘biological	  reductionism’	   that	   associates	   the	   biological	   with	   nothing	   more	   than	   an	   operation	   of	  sovereign	  power	  and	  control.	  Agamben,	  Derrida	  and	  Foucault	  all	  posit	  a	   form	  of	   life	   in	  excess	   of	   the	   biological	   precisely	   because	   the	   biological	   is	   associated	   with	   a	  programmatic	   and	   calculating	   rationality	   and	   reductionism.	   This	   approach	   is	   perhaps	  most	  succinctly	  captured	  in	  Derrida’s	  claim	  that	  the	  value	  of	  life	  must	  be	  ‘more	  than’	  the	  bio-­‐zoological	  definition	  of	  life.18	  In	  this	  notion	  of	  an	  ‘excess’	  to	  life,	  life	  is	  doubled:	  there	  is	   a	   biological,	   material	   and	   programmable	   body	   and	   a	   symbolic	   and	   poetic	   body	   in	  excess	   of	   the	   biological.	   It	   is	   as	   if	   there	   is	   something	   ‘more	   than’	   or	   at	   least	   parasitic	  upon	  biological	  life	  that	  is	  irreducible	  to	  it.	  This	  excess	  or	  supplement	  to	  life	  is	  the	  very	  thing	   that	   Kantorowitz	   describes	   in	   his	   study	   of	   medieval	   kingship:	   a	   body	   natural,	  mortal	   and	   ‘subject	   to	   infirmities’	   and	   a	   body	   that	   that	   ‘cannot	   be	   seen	  or	   handled’;	   a	  body	   that	   is	   purely	   symbolic.19	  In	   contrast,	   Malabou	   approaches	   ‘life’	   as	   being	   wholly	  reducible	   to	   the	   biological	   but	   nonetheless	   political	   or	   poetic	   for	   this	   reduction.	   She	  presents	   political	   life,	   not	   as	   a	   supplement	   to	   zoe,	   but	   simply	   as	   life	   as	   such.	   As	   she	  emphatically	  declares:	  ‘there	  is	  but	  one	  life,	  one	  life	  only’20	  and	  this	  ‘one	  life’	  is	  a	  cerebral	  and	  material	  life,	  where	  the	  only	  transcendental	  to	  be	  found	  is	  ‘in	  the	  brain’	  not	  in	  some	  uncanny	   remainder	   or	   poetic	   excess	   to	   it.21	  Drawing	   on	  work	   in	   epigenetics,	   the	   field	  that	  studies	  those	  factors	  that	  allow	  for	  a	  genetic	  code	  to	  be	  ‘expressed’	  or	  ‘interpreted’	  in	  different	  ways,22	  Malabou	  argues	  for	  an	  originary	  imbrication	  of	  the	  biological	  and	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  Jacques	  Derrida,	  ‘Faith	  and	  Knowledge’	  in	  Gil	  Anidjar	  (ed.)	  Acts	  of	  Religion	  (Abingdon:	  Routledge,	  2010),	  87.	  19	  	  Kantorowitz,	  The	  King’s	  Two	  Bodies,	  7	  20	  Malabou,	  ‘One	  Life	  Only’.	  21	  Catherine	  Malabou,	  ‘Can	  We	  Relinquish	  the	  Transcendental’	  The	  Journal	  of	  Speculative	  
Philosophy,	  (2014)	  28(3),	  253.	  22	  Referring	  to	  Thomas	  Jenuwein,	  Malabou	  suggests	  that	  the	  difference	  between	  epigenetics	  and	  genetics	  can	  best	  be	  understood	  by	  analogy	  between	  the	  reading	  and	  writing	  of	  a	  book.	  If	  the	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symbolic	   ‘that	  never	  requires	  a	  transgression	  of	  the	  biological	  itself’.23	  From	  within	  the	  biological,	   the	  division	  between	  biological	  and	  symbolic	   life	   is	   rendered	   inoperative:	   if	  the	  biological	  and	   the	  experiential	   form	  a	  dialectical	  couplet	  within	  biological	  life	  itself,	  there	  can	  be	  no	   form	  of	   life	   that	   is	   irreducible	   to	   the	  biological	  and	   therefore	  no	   ‘bare	  life’	   that	   is	   produced	   in	   the	   formation	   of	   sovereignty.24	  Rather	   than	   abandon	   the	  biological,	   Malabou	   seeks	   to	   integrate	   it	   into	   new	   forms	   of	   political	   resistance,	  expanding	  the	  scope	  of	  political	  thought	  to	  embrace	  a	  biological	  critique	  of	  biopolitics.	  I	  want	   to	   turn	   briefly	   to	  Agamben’s	   account	   of	   ‘form-­‐of-­‐life’	   to	   examine	   how	  Malabou’s	  intervention	   both	   resonates	   with	   and	   diverges	   from	   Agamben’s	   thinking	   of	   how	   the	  syntagm	  ‘form-­‐of-­‐life’	  opens	  new	  (non-­‐sovereign)	  political	  possibilities.	  	  Much	  of	  Agamben’s	  work	  seeks	  to	  theorise	  a	  political	  life	  which	  no	  longer	  depends	  on	  a	  disjunction	  between	  ‘forms	  of	  life’	  (citizen,	  worker,	  refugee)	  and	  ‘life’	  itself.	  By	  rendering	  inoperative	  this	  division,	  Agamben	  seeks	  to	  undo	  sovereignty	  and	  open	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  political	  life	  that	  is	  ‘a	  life	  that	  can	  never	  be	  separated	  from	  its	  form,	  a	  life	  in	  which	  it	  is	  never	  possible	  to	  isolate	  something	  such	  as	  bare	  life’.25	  Agamben	  calls	  this	  ‘form-­‐of-­‐life’.	  This	  construction	  has	  been	  given	  a	  recent	  book-­‐length	  study	  in	  which	  Agamben	  finds	  a	  prototypical	   account	   in	   the	   cenobitic	   communities	   of	   the	   medieval	   Christian	   church	  where	   ‘what	  was	  in	  question	  in	  the	  movements	  [of	  monastic	   life]	  was	  not	  the	  rule,	  but	  the	   life,	  not	   the	  ability	   to	  profess	   this	  or	   that	  article	  of	   faith,	  but	   the	  ability	   to	   live	   in	  a	  certain	   way,	   to	   practice	   joyfully	   and	   openly	   a	   certain	   form	   of	   life’.26	  Importantly	   for	  Agamben,	  the	  power	  and	  innovation	  of	  the	  Franciscans	  was	   in	  resituating	   life	  ahead	  of	  
rule	  or	  form.	  In	  these	  ascetic	  communities,	  ‘the	  form	  is	  not	  a	  norm	  imposed	  on	  life,	  but	  a	  living	   that	   in	   following	   the	   life	   of	   Christ	   gives	   itself	   and	  makes	   itself	   a	   form’.27	  In	   this	  evocation	  of	  a	  quasi-­‐plastic	  notion	  of	   ‘life’	  that	  gives	  and	  makes	  a	  form	  of	   life	  for	  itself,	  Agamben	  and	  Malabou	  appear	  very	  close	  indeed.	  However,	  the	  ‘life’	  revealed	  in	  a	  form-­‐of-­‐life,	  such	  as	   that	  pursued	  by	  the	  medieval	  Franciscans,	   is	  not	  strictly	   ‘biological’	  but	  emerges	   as	   a	   ‘third	   thing’	   between	   life	   and	   form.28	  In	   the	   same	   way	   that	   Malabou	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  genetic	  code	  is	  written	  and	  fixed,	  this	  code	  will	  be	  ‘read’	  or	  ‘interpreted’	  in	  different	  depending	  on	  environment,	  experience	  and	  other	  non-­‐genetic	  factors;	  see	  Malabou,	  ‘One	  Life	  Only’.	  23	  Malabou,	  ‘Will	  Sovereignty	  ever	  be	  Deconstructed’,	  44.	  24	  Malabou	  makes	  it	  clear	  that	  her	  argument	  does	  not	  diminish	  the	  symbolic	  or	  poetic	  dimension	  to	  life,	  rather	  it	  calls	  on	  us	  to	  reject	  the	  sense	  that	  such	  a	  poetic	  or	  symbolic	  dimension	  to	  life	  is	  
irreducible	  to	  biological	  life.	  25	  Giorgio,	  Agamben,	  Means	  without	  End:	  Notes	  on	  Politics	  (Minneapolis:	  University	  of	  Minnesota	  Press,	  2000),	  3-­‐4.	  26	  Giorgio	  Agamben,	  The	  Highest	  Poverty:	  Monastic	  Rules	  and	  Form-­‐of-­‐life	  (Stanford:	  Stanford	  University	  Press,	  2013).	  	  27	  Ibid.,	  105.	  28	  Ibid.,	  xi.	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underlines	   how	   Agamben’s	   ‘bare	   life’	   is	   irreducible	   to	   biological	   life,	   ‘form-­‐of-­‐life’	   is	  clearly	   an	   addendum	   to	   the	   biological	   and	   so	   seems	   to	   sustain	   the	   very	   bifurcated	  structure	   to	   life	   that	   underpins	   sovereignty.	   Agamben’s	   reticence	   about	   the	   biological	  sciences	   is	   based	   on	   the	   belief	   that	   they	   remain	   resolutely	   on	   the	   side	   of	   biopolitical	  control;	   it	   is	   precisely	   the	   medicalization	   of	   life	   under	   the	   auspices	   of	   biology	   that	  reduces	  forms	  of	  life	  to	  bare	  life,	  naked	  before	  the	  ‘dull	  witted	  masks	  of	  the	  powerful’.29	  It	   is	   here	   that	   Malabou	   and	   Agamben	   diverge.	   It	   is	   this	   out-­‐dated	   account	   of	   the	  biological	  that	  Malabou	  argues	  needs	  to	  be	  rejected.	  Biology	  is	  not	  simply	  an	  instrument	  of	  sovereign	  power	  that	  reduces	  life	  to	  the	  merely	  measurable	  and	  calculable	  but	  offers	  an	  account	  of	   life	  that	  might,	   in	  fact,	   fulfil	   the	  political	  aspirations	  traced	  in	  Agamben’s	  work.	  Unlike	  Agamben,	  Malabou	  wagers	  on	  a	  liberatory	  role	  for	  the	  biological	  sciences.	  For	   Malabou	   ‘form-­‐of-­‐life’	   must	   be	   wholly	   biological,	   it	   cannot	   be	   some	   ‘third	   thing’	  
between	  form	  and	  life;	  as	  she	  makes	  clear:	  ‘there	  is	  one	  life	  only’.	  	  The	   challenge	   of	   Malabou’s	   thought	   is	   to	   develop	   an	   account	   of	   form-­‐of-­‐life	   that	  embraces,	  rather	  than	  jettisons,	  the	  insights	  of	  biological	  science.	  Rather	  than	  approach	  form-­‐of-­‐life	   as	   exceeding	   or	   resisting	   the	   reductionism	   of	   biology,	   Malabou’s	   thinking	  urges	  us	  to	  construct	  an	  account	  of	  life	  in	  which	  neuroplasticity	  takes	  on	  an	  essentially	  political	  function.	  The	  brain	  can	  no	  longer	  be	  reduced	  to	  a	  physical	  substrate	  on	  which	  certain	  ‘political	  forms’	  can	  be	  hung	  rather	  it	  should	  be	  viewed	  as	  the	  site	  of	  a	  dialectic	  between	  fixity	  and	  creation,	  zoe	  and	  bios.	  This	  conceives	  the	  material	  and	  cerebral	  self	  as	   itself	  a	  political	  being	  with	   inherent	  value	  and	  an	   immanent	  potentiality.	  Such	  a	   life	  would	  be	   ‘its	  own	  sign’,	  a	   life	   that	  no	   longer	   ‘resort	   to	  a	  realm	  beyond	  the	  real	   to	  give	  meaning	  to	  its	  reality’.30	  	  	  Malabou	  undoubtedly	  offers	  an	  important	  criticism	  of	  contemporary	  critical	  theory	  that	  has	   been	   slow	   to	   adjust	   its	   account	   of	   the	   biological.	   Notwithstanding	   this,	   I	   find	  Malabou’s	   insistence	   on	   the	   centrality	   of	   the	   biological,	   and	   more	   specifically	   ‘the	  cerebral’,	  to	  be	  a	  rather	  jarring	  counterpoint	  to	  her	  efforts	  to	  transcend	  sovereignty.	  The	  brain	  and	  a	  care	  for	  the	  cerebral	  becomes	  the	  centrepiece	  of	  Malabou’s	  politics,	  with	  an	  image	   of	   ‘our	   brains	   to	   come’	   forming	   the	   basis	   of	   a	   non-­‐sovereign	   politics	   aimed	   at	  fostering	  an	  ‘alter-­‐globalism’.31	  In	  the	  wake	  of	  a	  challenge	  to	  sovereignty	  it	  is	  all	  too	  easy	  to	   fall	   into	   the	   trap	   of	   asserting	   a	   new	   centre	   or	   foundation	   in	   sovereignty’s	   stead.	   In	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  Agamben,	  Means	  Without	  End,	  8.	  30	  Malabou,	  ‘The	  King’s	  Two	  (Biopolitical)	  Bodies’,	  103.	  31	  Malabou,	  What	  Should	  we	  do	  with	  our	  Brain	  (New	  York:	  Fordham	  University	  Press,	  2008).	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Malabou’s	  account,	  is	  it	  not	  the	  cerebral	  that	  appears	  to	  fill	  the	  gap	  left	  by	  sovereignty’s	  deconstruction,	  fulfilling	  the	  role	  of	  summum	  supremus	  once	  occupied	  by	  the	  sovereign?	  As	  James	  Martel	  has	  described,	  the	  resistance	  to	  sovereignty	  reveals	  a	  ‘trap’:	  that	  empty	  place	   that	   we	   desperately	   seek	   to	   fill	   with	   some	   new	   supposedly	   ‘post-­‐sovereign’	  panacea.32	  Malabou’s	  privileging	  of	  the	  cerebral	  as	  a	  site	  in	  which	  a	  dialectic	  between	  the	  biological	  and	  the	  experiential	  is	  played	  out	  goes	  some	  way	  in	  challenging	  the	  structure	  of	   sovereignty	   in	   refusing	   to	   posit	   the	   cerebral	   as	   an	   essence.	  But	   it	   is	   ultimately	   the	  brain	   which	   becomes	   the	   fundamental	   ground	   for	   her	   thinking.	   It	   is	   precisely	   a	   turn	  
within	   that	  Malabou	   advocates,	   hoping	   that	   her	   readers	  will	   ‘imagine	   the	   brain	   as	   an	  image	  of	  the	  world	  to	  come’.33	  Is	  an	  alternative	  gesture	  not	  possible?	  One	  that	  does	  not	  seek	   to	   ground	   the	   deconstruction	   of	   sovereignty	   on	   cerebrality	   and	   instead	   makes	  inoperative	   this	   desire	   for	   a	   sovereign	   ground?	   Can	   we	   live	   with	   that	   lacuna	   that	   a	  deconstruction	  of	  sovereignty	  exposes?	  	  	  Malabou’s	  disciplinary	   focus	  prompts	   further	  questions.	  As	  suggested	  at	   the	  outset,	  by	  approaching	  sovereignty	  through	  a	  theorisation	  of	  ‘life’	  in	  a	  philosophical	  and	  biological	  register,	  Malabou	  ignores	  the	  function	  of	  the	  juridical	  in	  giving	  voice	  and	  material	  form	  to	   sovereignty.	   In	   this	   sense,	   Malabou’s	   plastic	   reading	   of	   sovereignty	   remains	  incomplete	  because	  it	  fails	  to	  account	  for	  how	  juridical	  techniques	  are	  implicated	  in	  the	  production	  of	  the	  sovereign	  form.	  As	  we	  discussed	  above,	  a	  plastic	  reading	  privileges	  the	  question	  of	  form,	  seeking	  to	  account	  for	  the	  ‘game	  of	  the	  donation	  and	  reception	  of	  form’	  in	   a	   given	   context.	   In	   what	   follows	   I	   remain	   committed	   to	   Malabou’s	   methodological	  concern	   with	   form	   approach	   but	   I	   turn	   my	   attention	   to	   the	   techniques	   that	   produce	  sovereignty’s	  form	  within	  juridical	  sphere.	  This,	  I	  argue,	  necessitates	  an	  encounter	  with	  ‘jurisdiction’.	   Beyond	   expanding	  Malabou’s	   plastic	   reading	   strategy	   into	   a	   sphere	   that	  she	  conspicuously	  avoids,	  this	  focus	  on	  the	  juridical	  is,	  I	  argue,	  a	  necessary	  component	  to	   any	   critical	   reading	   of	   sovereignty.	   By	   examining	   two	   jurisdictional	   technologies	   in	  the	  following	  section,	  we	  can	  account	  for	  the	  bifurcation	  of	  life	  that	  animates	  Malabou’s	  intervention.	   This	   allows	  us	   to	   return	  with	   greater	   clarity	   to	   the	   relation	  between	   life	  and	  the	  sovereign	  form	  in	  the	  final	  section	  as	  we	  turn	  to	  Saramago’s	  novel.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32	  James	  Martel,	  Divine	  Violence:	  Walter	  Benjamin	  and	  the	  Eschatology	  of	  Sovereignty	  (Abingdon:	  Routledge,	  2012).	  	  33	  Malabou,	  What	  Should	  we	  do	  with	  our	  Brain,	  82.	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II	  Jurisdiction	  giving	  form	  to	  sovereignty	  	  In	   the	  burgeoning	   literature	  on	  sovereignty	  discussion	  of	   jurisdiction	  has	  been	   largely	  absent.	   Not	   only	   in	   Malabou	   but	   also	   Agamben,	   Derrida	   and	   Foucault’s	   engagements	  with	   sovereignty	   there	   is	   no	  mention	   of	   jurisdiction.	   In	   this	   section	   I	   pursue	   a	   plastic	  reading	   of	   sovereignty	   from	  within	   the	   juridical	   sphere	   through	   an	   exploration	   of	   the	  theoretical	   and	   political	   implications	   of	   this	   seemingly	   innocuous	   and	   technocratic	  term.34 	  Rather	   than	   see	   jurisdiction	   as	   a	   product	   or	   depository	   of	   sovereignty,	   I	  approach	   jurisdiction	  as	   the	   technique	   through	  which	   the	   form	  of	   sovereignty	   is	   itself	  given	  shape.	  There	  can	  be	  no	  sovereignty	  without	  jurisdiction	  because	  it	  is	  jurisdiction	  that	   reveals	   the	   form	   of	   sovereignty	   itself.	   This	   sense	   of	   jurisdiction	   has	   been	   largely	  overlooked	   because	   the	   term	   is	   too-­‐readily	   associated	   with	   procedural	   technicalities.	  Indeed,	   the	   ‘technical’	   view	   of	   jurisdiction	   that	   focuses	   on	   matters	   of	   standing,	  procedure	   and	   the	   scope	   of	   juridical	   authority	   allows	   the	   source	   of	   law’s	   power	   to	  appear	   precisely	   as	   technical	   rather	   than	   political.35	  Shaunnagh	   Dorsett	   and	   Shaun	  McVeigh	   have	   sought	   to	   challenge	   many	   of	   common-­‐place	   assumptions	   about	  jurisdiction	   by	   highlighting	   how	   various	   ‘jurisdictional	   technologies’	   –	  from	   forms	   of	  legal	   writing	   like	   writs	   to	   cartographic	   techniques	   that	   represent	   legal	   space	   –	  are	  central	  to	  producing	  the	  legal	  form	  and	  are	  the	  means	  by	  which	  bodies	  are	  caught	  within	  the	  ambit	  of	  the	  law.36	  Jurisdictional	  technologies	  bring	  bodies,	  spaces	  and	  actions	  into	  lawful	  relation,	  attaching	  life	  to	  a	  sovereign	  authority	  and	  delineating	  the	  limits	  of	  a	  legal	  community.	   In	   what	   follows,	   I	   want	   to	   focus	   on	   two	   jurisdictional	   technologies	  unexamined	  by	  Dorrsett	  and	  McVeigh	  –	  the	  constitutional	  declaration	  and	  the	  decision	  on	   the	  state	  of	  exception	  –	  in	  order	   to	  assess	   the	  complicities	  between	   legal	   technique	  and	  the	  form	  of	  sovereignty.	  The	  declaration	  and	  the	  exception	  are	  techniques	  typically	  associated	   with	   an	   assertion	   of	   sovereignty	   and	   are	   usually	   read	   as	   being	  quintessentially	  political.	   But	   both	   are	   concerned	   precisely	  with	   the	   limit	   point	   of	   the	  juridical	  as	  much	  as	  they	  are	  with	  the	  foundation	  or	  maintenance	  of	  the	  polis.	  By	  reading	  these	  two	  technologies	  through	  the	  lens	  of	   jurisdiction	  rather	  than	  sovereignty	  per	  se,	  I	  hope	  to	  offer	  a	  more	  nuanced	  account	  of	  the	  relation	  between	  sovereignty,	  life	  and	  law,	  supplementing	  Malabou’s	  plastic	  reading	  of	  sovereignty.	  	  	  The	   political	   piquancy	   of	   jurisdiction	   can	   be	   most	   acutely	   sensed	   in	   the	   act	   of	  constitution-­‐making,	  in	  the	  moment	  when	  a	  community	  declares	  its	  presence	  and	  grants	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  In	  this	  sense	  I	  am	  following	  Kaushal	  in	  moving	  the	  growing	  theoretical	  literature	  on	  jurisdiction	  towards	  political	  rather	  than	  literary	  or	  ethical	  concerns.	  	  	  35	  Asha	  Kaushal,	  ‘The	  Politics	  of	  Jurisdiction’	  Modern	  Law	  Review	  (2015)	  78(5),	  782.	  	  36	  Shaunnagh	  Dorsett	  and	  Shaun	  McVeigh,	  Jurisdiction	  (Abingdon:	  Routledge,	  2012).	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itself	   the	   authority	   to	   make	   the	   law.	   This	   takes	   us	   towards	   the	   etymological	  underpinnings	  of	   jurisdiction	  (ius	  dicere,	   ‘to	  speak	   the	   law’)	   found	   in	   the	  Digest	   (2.1.1)	  and	   Benveniste. 37 	  It	   is	   through	   this	   performative	   speech	   act	   that	   a	   collective	  circumscribes	   its	   borders	   and	   thus	   forms	   a	   political	   community.	   In	   Douzinas’s	   terms,	  this	   act	   of	   ‘juris-­‐diction’	   (a	   speaking	   of	   the	   law)	   rests	   upon	   the	   existence	   of	   ‘bare	  sovereignty’,	   a	   logical	   presupposition	   of	   a	   political	   collective	   willing	   and	   able	   to	   give	  itself	  authority	  to	  rule.38	  This	  sovereignty	  is	  bare	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  it	  is	  not	  yet	  actualised	  or	  announced,	   its	   sovereignty	   is	   latent	  or	  undetermined.	  The	   function	  of	   jurisdiction	  –	  by	   virtue	   of	   an	   act	   of	   ‘fabulous	   retroactivity’39	  –	  is	   to	   confer	   on	   this	   collective	   a	  sovereign	   and	   unified	   status.	   In	   the	   performative	   declaration	   through	   which	   the	  presence	   of	   the	   community	   is	   both	   described	   and	   performed	   jurisdiction	   creates	   an	  abstracted,	   singular	   and	   closed	   political	   form.	   As	   Douzinas	   notes,	   this	   is	   achieved	  through	   the	   elision	   of	   two	   distinct	   speaking	   positions:	   the	   subject	   of	   enunciation,	   the	  authors	   of	   the	  declaration	   stricto	  sensu,	   and	   the	   subject	   of	   statement,	   those	   attributed	  with	  its	  authorial	  power:	   ‘the	  people’,	   ‘God’,	  or	   ‘humanity’.	  Following	  Jean-­‐Luc	  Nancy,40	  Douzinas	  describes	  how	  the	   jurisdictional	  event	   ‘mirrors	   the	   individuality	  of	   the	   juris-­‐dictator	   (he	  who	  speaks	   the	   law),	   [by	   fashioning]	  a	  unified	  body	  which…	  wills	   the	   law	  singularly	   and	   speaks	   through	   its	   foil	   and	   representative,	   the	   sovereign,	   legislator	   or	  judge’.41	  Through	  the	  sleight	  of	  hand	  provided	  by	  the	  rhetorical	  device	  of	  the	  synecdoche	  –	  through	   which	   the	   part	   represents	   the	   whole	   –	  jurisdiction	   appeals	   to	   a	   universal,	  abstracted	   and	   sovereign	   figure	   (humanity,	   God,	   ‘the	   people’)	   as	   a	   veiled	  countersignatory	  to	  the	  particular	  affirmation	  of	  a	  given	  community.	  The	  jurisdictional	  moment	   performs	   this	   ellipsis,	   whether	   it’s	   Moses,	   Solo	   or	   a	   modern	   constitutional	  assembly,	  	  jurisdiction	  allows	  us	  to	  act	  as	  if	  the	  particular	  and	  concrete	  speaks	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  general	  and	  abstract.	  	  	  It	   is	   the	  as	  if	  that	  opens	  a	  space	   for	  an	   interruptive	  critique	  that	  we	  will	  pursue	  below	  through	   a	   reading	   of	   Seeing.	   At	   this	   stage,	   however,	   let	   us	   note	   that	   in	   this	   reading	  jurisdiction	   achieves	   two	   things.	   Firstly	   the	   declarative	   announcement	   retrospectively	  converts	   a	   ‘bare’	   and	   ‘a-­‐legal’	   collective	   into	   something	   sanctioned	  and	  determined	  by	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  See	  Shaunnagh	  Dorsett	  and	  Shaun	  McVeigh,	  ‘Questions	  of	  Jurisdiction’	  in	  McVeigh	  ed.,	  
Jurisprudence	  of	  Jurisdiction	  (Abingdon:	  Routledge,	  2007),	  3.	  38	  Costas	  Douzinas,	  ‘The	  Metaphysics	  of	  Jurisdiction’	  in	  McVeigh	  ed.,	  Jurisprudence	  of	  Jurisdiction	  (Abingdon:	  Routledge,	  2007),	  21-­‐32.	  	  39	  Jacques	  Derrida,	  ‘Declarations	  of	  Independence’	  in	  Rottenberg	  ed.,	  Negotiations:	  Interventions	  
and	  Interviews	  1971-­‐2001	  (Stanford:	  Stanford	  University	  Press,	  2002),	  50.	  40	  Jean-­‐Luc	  Nancy,	  ‘The	  Jurisdiction	  of	  the	  Hegelian	  Monarch’	  Social	  Research	  (1982),	  481-­‐516.	  41	  Douzinas,	  ‘The	  Metaphysics	  of	  Jurisdiction’,	  26.	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law.	   This	   allows	   a	   putatively	   political	  act	   to	   be	   captured	   by	   the	   juridical.	   It	   is	   at	   this	  moment	   that	   sovereignty	   can	   be	   given	   a	   determined	   form	   by	   virtue	   of	   jurisdiction’s	  delineation	  between	   inside/outside,	  perhaps	  most	   importantly	  distinguishing	  between	  illicit	   violence	   that	   challenges	   that	   newly	   created	   order	   and	   licit	   violence	   that	   created	  that	  order	  and	  now	  serves	  to	  protect	  it.	  Secondly,	  the	  jurisdictional	  moment	  re-­‐presents	  the	  ‘bare’	  political	  collective	  in	  the	  image	  of	  the	  juris-­‐dictator;	  that	  is,	  as	  a	  whole,	  unified	  and	  singular	  being	  that	  speaks	  with	  one	  voice.	  The	  sovereign	  community,	  then,	  is	  united	  –	  even	   if	   momentarily	   –	  in	   a	   single	   speech	   act	   to	   which	   all	   members	   must	   submit.42	  Without	   this	   function,	   sovereignty	   is	   nothing	   more	   than	   a	   mythological	   and	   formless	  assertion,	   abstracted	   from	   the	   real	   and	   without	   a	   claim	   to	   complete	   authority.	  Jurisdiction,	   gives	   form	   to	   sovereignty,	   determining	   its	   shape,	   limits	   and	   efficacy	   by	  attaching	  the	  life	  of	  the	  collective	  to	  the	  law	  of	  the	  sovereign.	  	  	  Let’s	   turn	  now	   to	   our	   second	   jurisdictional	   technology:	   the	   decision	   on	   the	   exception.	  Central	   to	  Schmitt’s	   reading	  of	   sovereignty	   is	   that	   the	  decision	  on	   the	  exception	   is	  not	  	  political	  or	  factual	  matter	  but	  juridical.43	  To	  understand	  this	  claim	  we	  can	  refer	  back	  to	  the	   constitutional	   moment	   described	   by	   Douzinas	   in	   which	   an	   informal	   or	   ‘bare’	  constituent	  power	  becomes	  constituted,	  formalised	  and	  juridified.	  In	  the	  same	  way	  that	  constituent	  power	  is	  connected	  to	  every	  juridical	  order	  as	   its	   founding	  (but	  as	  yet	   ‘un-­‐constituted’,	   ‘bare’	   or	   ‘formless’)	   authority,	   so	   too	   is	   the	   exception	   (itself	   equally	  formless	  because	   its	   limits	   cannot	  be	  determined	   in	  advance	  by	  a	  norm)	  bound	   to	   the	  juridical.	   In	   this	   sense,	   the	   state	   of	   exception	   is	   the	   obverse	   of	   the	   founding	  constitutional	  moment,	   both	   act	  without	   direct	   legal	   sanction	   but	   the	   preservation	   or	  creation	  of	  the	  legal	  order	  itself	  is	  the	  act’s	  ultimate	  justification.	  Agamben	  captures	  the	  indeterminacy	  of	  the	  law	  in	  this	  context	  by	  describing	  the	  decision	  as	  having	  the	  ‘force	  of	  law’,44	  suggesting	  that	  in	  the	  state	  of	  exception	  the	  law	  is	  present	  but	  not	  in	  force.	  In	  this	  way	  we	   can	   see	   how	   the	   exception	   describes	   law’s	   pure	   potentiality	   –	  a	   fictio,	   as	  Agamben	   has	   it45	  –	  that	   allows	   for	   anything	   that	   appears	   to	   fall	   outside	   the	   law	   to	   be	  caught	   within	   its	   ambit	   through	   the	   operation	   of	   the	   exception.	   In	   this	   way,	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  42	  Following	  the	  biblical	  account	  of	  the	  Tower	  of	  Babel,	  Hobbes	  makes	  a	  similar	  point.	  In	  asserting	  that	  there	  is	  no	  divine	  order	  governs	  the	  correspondence	  between	  language	  and	  the	  world,	  the	  sovereign,	  whose	  voice	  is	  law,	  emerges	  as	  he	  who	  can	  maintain	  this	  relation.	  The	  sovereign’s	  voice	  establishes	  an	  ‘authoritative	  vocabulary’,	  as	  Loughlin	  puts	  it,	  that	  can	  guarantee	  both	  the	  social	  and	  linguistic	  orders.	  See	  Thomas	  Hobbes,	  Leviathan,	  ed.	  	  Richard	  Tuck	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1991),	  24-­‐26	  and	  Martin	  Loughlin,	  Sword	  and	  Scales:	  
An	  Examination	  of	  the	  Relationship	  Between	  Law	  and	  Politics	  (Oxford:	  Hart,	  2000),	  132.	  	  43	  Carl	  Schmitt,	  Political	  Theology:	  Four	  Chapters	  on	  the	  Concept	  of	  Sovereignty	  (Chicago:	  Chicago	  University	  Press,	  2005).	  44	  Giorgio	  Agamben,	  State	  of	  Exception	  (Chicago:	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  2003),	  32-­‐40.	  45	  Ibid.,	  39.	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exception	   allows	   for	   all	   of	   life	   to	   be	   captured	   by	   the	   law	   because,	   by	   virtue	   of	   the	  exception	  there	  is	  nothing	  in	  principle	  to	  which	  the	  law	  cannot	  apply.	  In	  the	  same	  way	  that	   the	   jurisdictional	   declaration	   captures	   the	   heterogeneous,	   undetermined,	   ‘bare’	  collective	  within	  the	  juridical,	  the	  decision	  on	  the	  exception	  is	  an	  act	  that	  attaches	  law	  to	  a	  bare	  factuality,	  ‘juridicizing	  all	  politics’46.	  	  The	   technique	   of	   the	   exception,	   in	   which	   life	   is	   brought	   into	   a	   lawful	   relation	   with	  sovereign	   power,	   reveals	   that	   the	   form	   of	   sovereignty	   emerges	   by	   virtue	   of	   a	  jurisdictional	  delimitation.	  Schmitt	  dismisses	  jurisdiction	  as	  an	  ‘irrelevant	  technicality’47	  associated	   with	   the	   failed	   efforts	   to	   constitutionally	   circumscribe	   in	   advance	   of	   an	  emergency	   the	   scope	  of	   an	  exception.	  But	  we	  need	   to	   think	  of	   jurisdiction	  beyond	   the	  purely	  technical.	  It	  is	  precisely	  a	  threshold	  between	  law	  and	  non-­‐law	  and	  a	  question	  of	  law’s	  applicability	  that	   is	  at	   issue	   in	  the	  state	  of	  exception;	  and	  as	  Kaushal	  rhetorically	  queries:	  	  What	  lives	  between	  law	  and	  non-­‐law	  if	  not	  jurisdiction?	  What	  concept	  governs	  whether	  law	   is	   applicable	   if	   not	   jurisdiction?	   What	   polices	   the	   limits	   of	   the	   legal	   order	   if	   not	  jurisdiction?	   If	   jurisdiction	   amounts	   to	   the	   delimitation	   of	   a	   sphere	   that	   is	   the	  precondition	  for	  the	  juridical	  as	  such,	  then	  surely	  this	  is	  its	  work.	  This	  jurisdiction	  is	  not	  apolitical,	   it	   does	   not	   only	   manage	   technical	   legal	   rules.	   It	   is	   robustly	   implicated	   in	  politics	   and	   sovereignty,	   part	   of	   the	   original	   constitution	   of	   the	   polis	   as	   well	   as	   its	  ongoing	  reconstitution.48	  Not	  only	  is	  jurisdiction	  ‘robustly	  implicated’	  in	  sovereignty	  it	   is	  what	  gives	  sovereignty	  its	  very	  form,	  it	  is	  what	  prevents	  the	  exception	  from	  descending	  into	  chaos	  or	  anomie,	  it	  guarantees	  the	  integrity	  of	  the	  polis	  despite	  the	  suspension	  of	  a	  norm	  in	  the	  name	  of	  an	  ‘emergency’.	   But	   on	   this	   point	   Kaushal	   errs.	   For	   her,	   it	   is	   jurisdiction	   that	   ‘rests	   on	  sovereignty’49	  but	  isn’t	  the	  key	  insight	  here	  that	  sovereignty	  is	  utterly	  formless	  without	  jurisdiction?	   The	   ‘juristic	   order’	   that	   remains	   in	   the	  wake	   of	   the	   suspension	   of	   law	   is	  guaranteed	  by	  a	  delimiting,	  jurisdictional	  force	  that	  allows	  for	  the	  state	  to	  remain	  even	  though	  the	  formal	  legal	  order	  has	  been	  suspended.	  It	  is	  the	  jurisdictional	  technology	  of	  the	  exception	  that	  allows	  for	  sovereignty	  to	  intervene	  in	  the	  world,	  capturing	  life	  within	  a	   delimited	   and	   ‘lawful’	   order,	   allowing	   sovereignty	   to	   be	   more	   than	   a	   formless	   or	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  46	  Jessica	  Whyte,	  Catastrophe	  and	  Redemption:	  The	  Political	  Thought	  of	  Giorgio	  Agamben	  (New	  York:	  SUNY	  Press,	  2013),	  61.	  	  47	  Kaushal,	  ‘The	  Politics	  of	  Jurisdiction’,	  786.	  48	  Ibid.	  49	  Ibid.	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anomic	  assertion	  of	  power.	  As	  Dorsett	  and	  McVeigh	  suggest:	   ‘sovereignty…	  [follows]	  in	  jurisdiction’s	  wake’.50	   	  	  	  Jurisdiction	  attaches	  life	  to	  sovereignty	  through	  the	  instantiation	  of	   lawful	  relations:	   in	  both	  examples	  above,	  jurisdiction	  re-­‐presents	  the	  factual	  as	  juridical	  and	  brings	  bodies	  into	   the	   law’s	   ambit.	   This	   key	   insight	   returns	   us	   to	   the	   bifurcation	   of	   ‘life’	   that	   is	   the	  focus	  of	  Malabou’s	  reading	  of	  sovereignty.	  Let	  us	  return	  to	  the	  technology	  of	  declaration	  to	  make	   this	  point	   clear.	   In	  our	  discussion	  of	   the	  declaration	  above	  we	  suggested	   that	  ‘the	  people’	  is	  inadequate	  to	  itself.	  There	  is	  an	  irreducible	  gap	  between	  the	  incorrigibly	  plural	  fact	  of	  people	  who	  gather	  to	  demand	  change	  or	  claim	  their	  right	  to	  self-­‐rule	  and	  ‘the	   people’,	   juridified	   and	   unified	   by	   the	   juris-­‐dictator	   who	   gives	   them	   form.	   It	   is	  jurisdiction	   that	   allows	   for	   life	   to	   be	   attached	   to	   the	   sovereign	   by	   making	   visible	   a	  
separation	  between	  a	  concrete	  and	  particular	  ‘life’	  and	  an	  abstract	  ‘legal	  category’	  at	  the	  
very	  moment	   that	   it	   elides	   this	   very	  distinction,	   presenting	   ‘law’	   and	   ‘life’	   as	   entering	   a	  zone	   of	   indistinction	  whereby	   life	   in	   toto	   is	   captured	   by	   law.	   It	   is	   this	   that	   is	   the	   true	  mark	  of	  sovereignty’s	  claim	  over	   its	  subjects.	   It	   is	   jurisdiction	  that	  makes	  possible	   this	  constitutive	  split	  between	  an	  affective,	  material	  and	  biological	  ‘life’	  and	  a	  symbolic	  ‘form	  of	  life’	  that	  exceeds	  the	  biological.	  As	  Malabou	  describes	  it,	  sovereignty	  is	  ‘the	  result	  of	  a	  
transformation	  of	  [a]	  floating	  signifier	  into	  a	  rigid	  figure,	  that	  of	  the	  king	  or	  of	  the	  law’.51	  It	   is	  precisely	   jurisdiction	   that	   facilitate	   this	   transformation.	   Jurisdiction	  bears	  witness	  to	   the	   division	   of	   life	   and	   law	   at	   the	   same	   moment	   it	   reattaches	   life	   to	   a	   rigidly	  determined	   legal	   form.	   It	   is,	   then,	   jurisdiction	   that	   is	   doing	   the	  work	   of	  mutability	   or	  change	  here,	  it	  is	  jurisdiction	  that	  allows	  ‘life’	  to	  be	  re-­‐formed	  as	  split	  between	  biological	  and	  symbolic.	  Put	  differently,	  the	  jurisdictional	  moment	  attests	  to	  an	  affective	  and	  non-­‐representational	   ‘life’	   at	   very	   moment	   it	   denies	   the	   political	   force	   of	   that	   ‘life’	   by	  transforming	   it	   into	   some	   staid,	   symbolic	   legal	   category	   –	  ‘citizen’,	   ‘subject’	   or	   some	  other	  ‘legal	  person’	  –	  that	  owes	  its	  existence	  to	  the	  sovereign.	  	  	  But	  surely	  we	  cannot	  so	  easily	  give	  over	  to	  sovereignty	  what	  it	  desires.	  An	  intervention	  is	   possible,	   indeed	   it	   is	   already	  walled	   up	  within	   this	   very	  moment:	   this	   gap	   between	  ‘life’	  and	  ‘law’	  is	  what	  allows	  for	  the	  interruption	  of	  sovereignty.	  A	  critical	  questioning	  of	  sovereignty	  intervenes	  within	  this	  lacuna	  and	  asks,	  who	  is	  silenced	  in	  this	  moment,	  who	  is	   excluded,	   occluded	   or	   elided	   in	   the	   re-­‐presentation	   of	   ‘the	   people’?	   Such	   questions	  implicitly	  seek	  to	  foreground	  those	  non-­‐representational	  forces	  that	  are	  the	  condition	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  50	  Dorsett	  and	  McVeigh,	  Jurisdiction,	  64.	  51	  Malabou,	  ‘Will	  Sovereignty	  Ever	  Be	  Deconstructed?’,	  42,	  my	  emphasis.	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possibility	   for	   the	  assertion	  of	  a	  sovereign	  claim,	   foregrounding	  the	   ‘life’	   that	  precedes	  the	  ‘form’	  that	  jurisdiction	  constructs.	  This	  mode	  of	  critical	  engagement	  is	  not	  so	  much	  a	  matter	   of	   being	   ‘for’	   or	   ‘against’	   sovereignty	   but	   about	   seeing	   how	   the	   claim	   to	  sovereignty	  always	  harbours	  forces	  that	  undo	  it,	  challenge	  it	  and	  render	  it	  more	  fragile	  than	  we	  often	  like	  to	  think.	  In	  Seeing	  Saramago	  intervenes	  precisely	  in	  the	  gap	  that	  we	  have	   identified	   between	   life	   and	   law	   and	   refuses	   to	   allow	   ‘the	   people’	   to	   attain	   a	  sovereign	   form,	   underscoring	   instead	   the	   non-­‐representational	   forces	   that	   are	   the	  conditions	  of	  possibility	  for	  some	  future	  declaration	  of,	  or	  claim	  to,	  sovereignty.	  	  	  Saramago’s	   approach	   involves	   shifting	   attention	   away	   from	   the	   dominant	   units	   of	  political	  and	   legal	  discourse	  –	   the	  community,	   the	  subject,	   the	  state	  –	  and	  allows	  us	   to	  examine	  a	  political	  ontology	  that	  appears	  beyond	  or	  beneath	  the	  logic	  of	  representation	  on	  which	  sovereignty	  depends.	  As	  I	  discuss	  below,	  however,	  this	  does	  not	  disavow	  the	  need	  for	  a	  sovereign	  claim	  per	  se.	  As	  is	  well	  known	  demands	  for	  popular	  sovereignty	  are	  used	  by	  many	  seeking	  to	  resist	  hegemonic	  forces,	  whether	  colonial	  or	  –	  as	  recent	  events	  in	   Greece	   tell	   us	   –	   capitalist	   and	   technocratic.	   In	   many	   contexts	   popular	   sovereignty	  remains	  a	  valuable	  bulwark	  against	   the	   forces	  of	   imperialism	  and	  a	  cri	  de	  coeur	  in	   the	  face	  of	  a	  creeping	  technocracy.	  As	  Judith	  Butler	  has	  recently	  examined,	  it	  was	  the	  claim	  of	  popular	  sovereignty,	   the	  performance	  of	   ‘we	  the	  people’	   in	   the	  streets	  of	  New	  York,	  that	   gave	   life	   to	   the	   ‘Occupy	  Wall	   Street’	   movement	   of	   2011.52	  In	   this	   sense,	   I	   doubt	  whether	  we	   can	   follow	  Malabou	   in	   seeking	   to	   supersede	  all	  assertions	   of	   sovereignty	  
tout	   court.	   The	   critical	   task	   here	   is	   not	   to	   somehow	   ‘transcend’	   sovereignty	   but	   to	  understand	  the	  contexts	  in	  which	  it	  is	  claimed	  and	  the	  techniques	  deployed	  that	  give	  it	  form.	  My	  point,	  contra	  Malabou,	  is	  that	  perhaps	  we	  need	  to	  temper	  the	  desire	  to	  finally	  ‘cut	   off	   the	  king’s	  head’	   and	   construct	   a	  political	   theory	   that	   is	  no	   longer	  mediated	  by	  sovereignty.	   Perhaps,	   this	   ultimate	   regicide	   is	   too	   much	   to	   ask	   in	   the	   contemporary	  conjuncture.	   As	   Agamben	   suggests,	   the	   possibility	   of	   a	   new,	   post-­‐sovereign	   politics	   in	  which	  life	  is	  lived	  as	  a	  ‘form-­‐of-­‐life’	  will	  only	  begin	  ‘when	  all	  the	  West’s	  forms	  of	  life	  have	  reached	  their	  consummation’.53	  Clearly	  we’re	  not	  there	  yet.	  In	  an	  age	  in	  which	  politics	  in	  the	   West	   still	   operates	   within	   axes	   determined	   by	   the	   state	   and	   juridical	   power,	  strategic	   assertions	   of	   popular	   sovereignty	   are	   surely	   necessary.	   Rather	   than	   hope	   to	  transcend	   sovereignty,	   then,	   my	   reading	   of	   Seeing	   seeks	   to	   reveal	   how	   Saramago	  occupies	   that	   gap	   between	   life	   and	   law	   that	   the	   declaration	   hopes	   to	   elide	   and	   in	   so	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  52	  Judith	  Butler,	  Notes	  Towards	  a	  Performative	  Theory	  of	  Assembly	  (Cambridge	  MA:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  2015),	  154-­‐192.	  53	  Agamben,	  The	  Highest	  Poverty,	  143.	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doing	  offers	  an	  account	  of	  sovereignty,	  if	  not	  ‘deconstructed’,	  then	  at	  least	  ‘interrupted’.	  And	   perhaps	   sovereignty,	   with	   interruptions	   is	   the	   best	   our	   current	   political	  dispensation	  will	  allow.	  	  	  
III	  Saramago’s	  interruption	  of	  sovereignty	  	  What	  amazes	  me	   is	   that	   there	   isn’t	  a	   single	  shout,	  a	   single	   long	   live	  or	  down	  with,	  not	  a	   single	  slogan	   saying	  what	   it	   is	   the	  people	  want,	   just	   this	   threatening	   silence	   that	   sends	   shivers	  down	  your	  spine	  (José	  Saramago)54	  	  First	  published	  in	  2004,	  Saramago’s	  novel	  follows	  the	  fate	  of	  an	  unnamed	  capital	  city	  in	  the	  wake	  of	   a	   shock	  election.	  By	   lunchtime	  on	  polling	  day	  only	   a	   smattering	  of	   voters	  have	   cast	   a	   ballot.	   Heavy	   rain,	   an	   apathetic	   electorate	   and	   barely	   distinguishable	  political	  parties	  seem	  the	  immediate	  cause	  of	  this	  political	  dis-­‐engagement	  but	  by	  mid-­‐afternoon,	  without	  warning	  or	   instigation,	  residents	  pour	   into	  the	  streets	  and	  head	  for	  the	   polling	   stations.	   The	   cut-­‐off	   hour	   for	   casting	   ballots	   is	   extended	   and	   queues	   form	  throughout	   the	   capital	   bearing	  witness	   to	   an	   unexpected	   upsurge	   of	   civic	   virtue.	   The	  results,	   announced	   the	   next	   day,	   tell	   a	   different	   story.	   Valid	   votes	   do	   not	   even	   reach	  twenty-­‐five	   per	   cent,	   the	   right	   wins	   thirteen	   per	   cent,	   the	   left	   two	   per	   cent,	   and	   the	  ‘party	   in	   the	   middle’	   nine;	   seventy	   per	   cent	   of	   the	   votes	   cast	   are	   blank.	   A	   swiftly	  arranged	   re-­‐run	   reaches	   an	   even	  more	   devastating	   conclusion	  when	   eighty-­‐three	   per	  cent	   cast	   a	  blank	  ballot.	   In	   a	   clear	   reference	   to	   the	  West’s	   reaction	   to	  9/11,	   Saramago	  presents	  the	  state	  as	  bewildered,	  desperate	  and	  very	  quickly	  willing	  to	  suspend	  normal	  juridical	  procedure	  as	  a	  result	  of	  this	  unprecedented	  event.	  Widespread	  surveillance	  is	  deployed,	   a	   state	   of	   emergency	   is	   declared,	   five	   hundred	   citizens	   are	   detained	   and	  subject	   to	   polygraph-­‐assisted	   interrogations,	   and	   finally	   a	   state	   of	   siege	   is	   announced	  which	  sees	   the	  entire	  state	  apparatus	  withdraw	   from	  the	  city.	  The	  state	  vainly	  asserts	  that	   there	   must	   be	   a	   leader	   to	   this	   ‘movement’,	   a	   conspiracy,	   an	   organised	   plot	   to	  overthrow	  the	  government	  or	  at	  least	  some	  external	  agents	  pulling	  the	  strings.	  But	  none	  exists.	   Saramago’s	   blank	   voters	   collectively,	   silently,	   and	   without	   warning,	   simply	  
withdraw	  from	  the	  existing	  political	  domain.	  And,	  by	  and	  large,	  life	  carries	  on	  as	  normal.	  	  	  Throughout,	  the	  novel	  shifts	  perspective	  between	  the	  state’s	  increasingly	  authoritarian	  responses	  and	   the	   lives	   of	   the	   various	   actors	  who	   remain	   in	   the	   city:	   a	   council	   leader	  grappling	  with	   his	   conscience	   in	   a	   changing	   political	   climate,	   a	   police	   superintendent	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  54	  José	  Saramago,	  Seeing	  [Ensaio	  sobre	  a	  Lucidez],	  trans.,	  Margaret	  Jull	  Costa	  (London	  Vintage:	  2007),	  128.	  All	  subsequent	  references	  will	  be	  given	  in	  brackets	  in	  the	  main	  body	  of	  the	  text.	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charged	  with	  discovering	  (and	  in	  lieu	  of	  this,	  inventing)	  a	  cause	  for	  the	  blank	  votes,	  and	  a	   doctor	   and	   his	   wife	   who	   find	   themselves	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   the	   state’s	   conspiracy	  theories.55	  Strikingly,	  none	  of	  these	  characters	  is	  given	  a	  name,	  instead	  they	  are	  referred	  to	  by	  title,	  epithet	  or	  character-­‐trait.	  This	  poses	  the	  question	  of	  identity	  and	  the	  nature	  of	   representation	   as	   one	   of	   the	   novel’s	   key	   concerns	   and	   serves,	   through	   the	   use	   of	  litotes,	  to	  position	  ‘the	  people’	  of	  this	  unnamed	  city	  as	  the	  story’s	  hero.	  The	  state	  deploys	  all	   the	   techniques	   to	   which,	   in	   the	   ever-­‐intensifying	   paradigm	   of	   security,	   emergency	  and	  exceptionalism,	  we	  have	  all	  grown	  accustomed.	  And	  in	  the	  face	  of	  such	  techniques,	  Saramago	  imagines	  ‘the	  people’	  as	  an	  agent	  of	  uncanny	  force	  that	  can	  only	  be	  sensed	  in	  
withdrawal.	   In	   an	   important	   sense,	  whilst	   a	   hero	   of	   the	   narrative,	   ‘the	   people’	   do	   not	  exist	  in	  this	  novel.	  The	  legal	  form	  of	  a	  delimited	  collective	  identity	  is	  never	  posited	  and	  is	  never	  given	  voice;	  the	  jurisdictional	  technology	  of	  the	  declaration	  is	  disavowed.	  Indeed,	  it	  is	  precisely	  a	  non-­‐sovereign,	  non-­‐juridified	  collective	  that	  Saramago	  allows	  to	  appear	  in	  the	  city’s	  streets.	  As	  outlined	  above,	  the	  state’s	  use	  of	  the	  exception	  seeks	  to	  capture	  all	  actors	  within	  the	  ambit	  of	  the	  law	  and	  attach	  all	  life	  to	  the	  sovereign	  form.	  The	  city’s	  inhabitants	  render	  inoperative	  this	  claim	  and	  in	  their	  act	  of	  withdrawal	  reveal	  modes	  of	  belonging	  and	  solidarity	  that	  are	  –	  temporarily	  at	  least	  –	  not	  mediated	  by	  sovereignty.	  	  	  Crucial	   to	   this	   gesture	   of	   ‘withdrawal’	   is	   the	   privileging	   of	   those	   affective	   forces	   that	  both	   precede	   and	   exceed	   the	   titles,	   categories	   or	   offices	   that	   the	   state	   confers	   on	   its	  citizens.	   For	   instance,	   striking	   refuse	   collectors,	   strong-­‐armed	   into	   withdrawing	   their	  labour	   by	   a	   government	   hoping	   to	   cause	   disruption,	   return	   to	   work	   in	   plain	   clothes	  claiming	  that	  ‘their	  uniforms	  were	  on	  strike…	  not	  them’	  (93).	  Likewise,	  the	  city’s	  council	  leader	  quits	  his	  post	  and	   joins	   the	  people	   in	   the	  streets,	  unexpectedly	  moved	   to	  act	   in	  solidarity	  with	  his	  fellow	  citizens.	  And	  the	  super-­‐intendant	  tasked	  with	  uncovering	  the	  source	   of	   the	   blank	   voting,	   exposes	   the	   farce	   of	   the	   state’s	   conspiratorial	   theories	   by	  leaking	   condemning	   information	   to	   the	   press.	   Throughout,	   the	   ‘forms	   of	   life’	   that	   the	  state	  constructs	  for	  its	  citizens	  –	  including	  the	  category	  of	  ‘citizen’	  itself	  –	  are	  confronted	  by	  a	  ‘life’	  that	  overflows	  the	  given	  ‘form’	  that	  it	  supposedly	  represents.	  	  	  This	  foregrounding	  of	  a	  ‘life’	  that	  interrupts	  the	  techniques	  that	  the	  state	  deploys	  in	  an	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  55	  The	  latter	  are	  the	  focus	  of	  Blindness,	  Saramago’s	  companion	  piece	  to	  Seeing,	  in	  which	  the	  same	  very	  same	  city	  is	  struck	  by	  an	  unexplained	  plague	  of	  blindness,	  four	  years	  previous.	  The	  doctor’s	  wife	  –	  the	  only	  resident	  of	  Lisbon	  who	  did	  not	  succumb	  to	  the	  plague	  –	  is	  now	  considered	  the	  prime	  suspect	  for	  a	  leader	  of	  blank	  votes	  movement.	  For	  a	  reading	  of	  both	  novels	  through	  a	  Lacanian	  lens,	  see	  Maria	  Aristodemou,	  ‘Democracy	  or	  Your	  Life!	  Knowledge,	  Ignorance	  and	  the	  Politics	  of	  Atheism	  in	  Saramago’s	  Blindness	  and	  Seeing’	  Law	  Culture	  and	  Humanities	  (2011)	  9(1),	  169-­‐187.	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effort	   the	   control	   its	   citizens	   is	   introduced	   early	   in	   the	   novel	   as	  we	   follow	   the	   state’s	  interrogation	   of	   a	   group	   of	   five	   hundred	   citizens.	   Statistically	   speaking,	   of	   the	   five	  hundred	  detainees,	  there	  should	  be	  around	  three	  hundred	  and	  thirty	  blank	  voters.	  But	  not	  one	  confesses	  to	  casting	  a	  blank.	  As	  Saramago	  explains:	  That	   clear	   response	   [of	   “I	   cast	   a	   blank”],	   shorn	   of	   ambiguities,	   of	   presumption	   or	  prudence,	   would	   be	   the	   only	   one	   that	   their	   inflexible,	   honest	   natures,	   that	   of	   the	  computer	   and	   the	  machine,	   would	   have	   allowed	   themselves,	   but	   we	   are	   dealing	   here	  with	   human	   beings,	   and	   human	   beings	   are	   known	   universally	   as	   the	   only	   animals	  capable	  of	   lying,	  and	  while	   it	   is	  true	  that	  they	  sometimes	  lie	  out	  of	   fear	  and	  sometimes	  out	  of	  self-­‐interest,	  they	  also	  occasionally	  lie	  because	  they	  realise,	  just	  in	  time,	  that	  this	  is	  the	  only	  means	  available	  to	  them	  of	  defending	  the	  truth	  (40).	  What,	   then,	   is	   this	   ‘truth’	   that	   can	  only	  be	  defended	   in	   lying?	   In	  his	  description	  of	   the	  interrogations,	   Saramago	   stages	   a	   complex	   encounter	   between	   truth-­‐telling,	  representation,	   affect	   and	   the	   mechanistic.	   Significantly,	   these	   interrogations	   are	  conducted	   with	   the	   use	   of	   a	   ‘lie	   detector’	   that	   senses	   automatic,	   affective	   and	   non-­‐representational	   responses	   that	   are	   then	   interpreted	  by	   a	   technician	   as	   confirming	  or	  denying	  the	  statements	  of	  those	  under	  interrogation.	  The	  refusal	  to	  affirm	  that	  one	  cast	  a	  blank	  vote	  is	  in	  part	  a	  refusal	  to	  submit	  to	  state	  power	  but	  perhaps	  more	  importantly	  it	   is	   a	   refusal	   to	   enter	   into	   a	   game	   of	   representation	   in	   which	   the	   subject’s	   will	   is	  supposed	   to	   be	  wholly	   reducible	   to	   choices	  made	   in	   the	   voting	   booth.	   By	   refusing	   to	  submit	  to	  a	  representational	  account	  of	  truth,	  in	  which	  ‘truth’	  is	  reduced	  to	  a	  binary	  pre-­‐determined	  by	  the	  state	  (either	  you	  cast	  a	  blank	  or	  you	  did	  not),	  the	  detainees	  allow	  the	  lie	   detector	   to	   reveal	   another	   ‘truth’:	   the	   affective	   life	   of	   the	   body,	   that	   both	  precedes	  and	  exceeds	  the	  linguistic	  and	  cognitive	  ‘truths’	  that	  the	  state	  desires.	  It	  is	  the	  ‘truth’	  of	  these	   ‘mechanical’	   responses	   –	   the	   ‘twitching	   muscle’,	   the	   ‘unwanted	   sweat’,	   and	   the	  ‘blinking	  eyelids’	  (45)	  –	  captured	  by	  the	  polygraph	  machine,	  that	  affirms	  a	  life	  that	  is	  not	  reducible	   to	   the	   forms	  and	   categories	   that	   the	   state	   constructs.	  The	   following	  passage	  illustrates	  the	  point:	  They’ll	  connect	  you	  up	  to	  the	  machine	  again	  and	  it	  will	  be	  even	  worse,	  they’ll	  ask	  you	  if	  you’re	  alive	  and	  you’ll	  say,	  Of	  course	  I	  am,	  but	  your	  body	  will	  protest,	  will	  contradict	  you,	  the	  tremor	  in	  your	  chin	  will	  say	  no,	  you’re	  dead,	  and	  it	  might	  be	  right,	  perhaps	  your	  body	  knows	  before	  you	  do	  that	  they	  are	  going	  to	  kill	  you	  (45).	  The	  state	  thinks	   it	  can	  do	  with	  the	  body	  what	   it	  wills,	   transforming	  the	   living	  detainee	  into	   a	   ‘dead	   body’	   with	   the	   assistance	   of	   a	   machine	   supposedly	   able	   to	   subvert	   the	  patently	  true.	  But	  the	  ‘truth’	  that	  the	  state	  wants	  to	  extract,	  or	  construct,	  belies	  another	  ‘truth’	   that	   it	   cannot	   bear,	   the	   truth	   of	   an	   alive	   and	   affective	   body	   that	   presciently	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‘“knows”	  that	  it	  will	  soon	  be	  killed’,56	  a	  body	  that	  “knows”	  more	  than	  the	  lie	  detector	  can	  confirm	  or	  deny.	  It	  is	  the	  fact,	  as	  one	  detainee	  puts	  it,	  that	  ‘we	  cannot	  entirely	  trust	  our	  bodies’	   (49)	   that	   Saramago	   wants	   to	   underscore	   here:	   the	   biological,	   material	   and	  strangely	  mechanical	  fact	  of	  a	  living	  being	  is	  the	  very	  thing	  that	  undoes	  the	  forms	  of	  life	  that	  sovereign	  power	  hopes	  to	  impose.	  	  	  Like	  Malabou,	  Saramago	  finds	  a	  resistance	  to	  sovereignty	  in	  the	  biological	  and	  material	  stuff	   of	   life.	   But	   for	   Saramago,	   this	   is	   not	   a	   matter	   of	   cerebrality	   or	   a	   turn	  within	   to	  contemplate	  the	  life	  of	  our	  ‘brains	  to	  come’	  but	  prompts	  an	  experimentation	  with	  a	  form	  of	   collective	   life	   that	   challenges	   the	   state’s	   juridico-­‐political	   categories.	   It	   is	   an	  affirmation	  of	  an	  affective	  and	  material	  life	  of	  bodies	  in	  relation	  that	  animates	  the	  streets	  in	  Seeing.	  This	  is	  captured	  in	  the	  following,	  and	  I	  think	  rather	  extraordinary,	  passage	  in	  which	   Saramago	  describes	   the	   reaction	   to	   the	   state’s	   latest	   efforts	   to	   force	   the	   city	   to	  return	  to	  voting	  ‘normality’	  in	  which	  a	  bomb	  is	  set	  off	  in	  a	  train	  station,	  killing	  twenty-­‐seven	  people:	  	  The	  burials	  were	  therefore,	  purely	  secular,	  which	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that,	  here	  and	  there,	  a	  few	  private,	  silent	  prayers	  did	  not	  rise	  up	  to	  the	  various	  heavens	  to	  be	  welcomed	  there	  with	  benevolent	   sympathy.	   The	   graves	   were	   still	   open,	   when	   someone,	   doubtless	   with	   the	  best	   of	   intentions,	   stepped	   forward	   to	   give	   a	   speech,	   but	   this	   was	   immediately	  repudiated	  by	  the	  other	  people	  present,	  No	  speeches,	  we	  each	  have	  our	  own	  grief	  and	  we	  all	   feel	   the	   same	   sorrow.	   And	   the	   person	  who	   came	   up	  with	   this	   clear	   formulation	   of	  feelings	  was	   quite	   right.	   Besides,	   if	   that	  were	   the	   intention	   of	   the	   frustrated	   orator,	   it	  would	  be	  impossible	  to	  make	  a	  funeral	  oration	  for	  twenty-­‐seven	  people,	  both	  male	  and	  female,	   not	   to	  mention	   some	   small	   child	   with	   no	   history	   at	   all…	   To	   those	   punctilious	  readers,	  showing	  a	  praiseworthy	  concern	  for	  the	  good	  ordering	  of	  the	  story,	  who	  want	  to	  know	   why	   the	   usual,	   indispensible	   dna	   [sic.]	   tests	   were	   not	   carried	   out	   [in	   order	   to	  determine	  the	  identity	  of	  the	  dead],	  the	  only	  honest	  answer	  we	  can	  give	  is	  our	  own	  total	  ignorance,	  allow	  us,	  however,	  to	  imagine	  that	  the	  famous	  and	  much-­‐abused	  expression,	  Our	   dead,	   so	   commonplace,	   so	  much	  part	   of	   the	   routine	   patter	   of	   patriotic	   harangues,	  were	  to	  be	  taken	  literally	  in	  these	  circumstances,	  that	  is,	  if	  these	  dead,	  all	  of	  them,	  belong	  to	  us,	  we	  should	  not	  consider	  any	  of	  them	  exclusively	  ours,	  which	  would	  mean	  that	  any	  DNA	  analysis	  which	   took	   into	   account	   all	   the	   factors,	   including,	   in	   particular,	   the	  non-­‐biological	  ones,	  and	  however,	  hard	   it	  rummaged	  around	  inside	  the	  double	  helix,	  would	  only	  succeed	  in	  confirming	  a	  collective	  ownership	  which	  required	  no	  proof	  anyway…	  the	  earth	  was	  shovelled	  back	  into	  the	  graves,	  the	  flowers	  were	  shared	  out	  equally,	  those	  who	  had	  reasons	  to	  weep	  were	  embraced	  and	  consoled	  by	  others,	  if	  such	  a	  thing	  is	  possible	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  56	  Erin	  Graff	  Zivin,	  ‘Seeing	  and	  Saying:	  Towards	  an	  Ethics	  of	  Truth	  in	  José	  Saramago’s	  Ensaio	  
sobre	  a	  Lucidez,	  SubStance	  (2012),	  41(1),	  114.	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with	  such	  a	  recent	  grief.	  The	  loved	  one	  of	  each	  person,	  of	  each	  family,	  is	  here,	  although	  one	  does	  not	  quite	  know	  where,	  perhaps	  in	  this	  grave,	  perhaps	  in	  that,	  it	  would	  be	  best	  of	  we	  wept	  over	  all	  of	  them,	  as	  a	  shepherd	  once	  said,	  although	  heaven	  knows	  where	  he	  learned	  it,	  One	  can	  show	  no	  greater	  respect	  than	  to	  weep	  for	  a	  stranger	  (123-­‐124).	  	  In	   this	   affecting	   description,	   Saramago	   offers	   an	   account	   of	   collective	   life	   interrupting	  sovereignty.	  Those	  who	   stymie	   the	  mourners	   that	   are	  moved	   to	  offer	   a	   eulogy	   for	   the	  dead,	  do	  so	  in	  the	  name	  of	  the	  non-­‐representational:	  how	  could	  any	  speech	  do	  justice	  to	  these	   lives,	   how	   could	   one	   re-­‐present	   them,	   in	   any	  meaningful	  way?	   In	   lieu	   of	   such	   a	  speech,	   Saramago	   radicalises	   the	   claim	   that	   the	   dead	   might	   somehow	   be	   ‘ours’,	  exploring	  the	  way	  in	  which	  these	  lost	  lives	  might	  somehow	  belong	  to	  all	  of	  us.	  He	  posits	  a	  ‘collective	  ownership’	  that	  implicates	  all	  but	  is	  irreducible	  to	  one,	  evoking	  what	  Jean-­‐Luc	  Nancy	  has	  described	  as	  the	  ‘singular	  plurality	  of	  being’;	  an	  ontology	  in	  which	  we	  are,	  only	   in	   relation	   to	   others,	   that	   we	   can	   only	   be	   by	   being-­‐with.57	  The	   rather	   gruesome	  notion	   that	  body	  parts	  are	  shared	  out	  between	  graves	  –	  resting	   ‘perhaps	   in	   this	  grave,	  perhaps	   in	   that’	   –	  is	   transformed	   into	  an	  account	  of	   a	   collective	   life	   in	  which	  all	   life	   is	  similarly	  shared	  out,	  a	   ‘life’	  whose	  ontology	   is	  essentially	   ‘unlocatable’,	   it	  only	  appears	  
between	   self	   and	   other.	   Saramago	   describes	   this	   sharing	   out	   of	   being	   as	   a	   form	   of	  ‘collective	  ownership’	  that,	  significantly,	  needs	  no	  proof	  anyway.	  There	  are	  no	  title	  deeds,	  constitutions	  or	  other	  juridical	  forms	  that	  correspond	  to	  the	  sense	  of	  ‘social	  being’	  that	  Saramago	   evokes;	   it	   is	   a	   political	   ontology	   that	   is	   without	   ground,	   without	  representation	  and	  without	  sovereignty.	  	  	  The	  juridical	  techniques	  implicated	  in	  giving	  form	  to	  sovereignty;	  the	  ensiled,	  sovereign	  ‘self’	   beloved	   by	   the	   liberal	   constitution;	   and	   the	   logic	   of	   representation	   on	   which	  sovereignty	   rests	   are	   all	   rendered	   inoperative	   in	   this	   short	   passage.	  By	   intervening	   in	  the	   gap	   between	   life	   and	   law,	   Saramago	   privileges	   a	   life	   that	   persists	   without	   the	  juridical,	  a	  life	  that,	  through	  its	  material	  and	  emotional	  affects,	  reveals	  a	  shared	  sense	  of	  being	  that	  undoes	  the	  claims	  that	  sovereignty	  makes	  of	  subjects.	  Where	  Malabou	  turns	  
within	   to	   the	   self,	   Saramago	   turns	  without,	   towards	   others.	   Where	   Malabou	   seeks	   to	  ground	   her	   deconstruction	   of	   sovereignty	   on	   the	   cerebral,	   Saramago	   exposes	   the	  groundlessness	  of	  being	  as	  a	  being-­‐with	  that	  exceeds	  representation.	  	  	  Saramago’s	   interruption	   of	   sovereignty	   is	   powerful	   and	   effective.	   However,	   the	   novel	  ends	  by	  suggesting	  that	  the	  withdrawal	  that	  the	  people	  perform	  is	  ultimately	  futile	  in	  the	  face	  of	  overwhelming	  state	  power.	  The	  doctor’s	  wife	  and	  the	  super-­‐intendant,	  whose	  co-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  57	  See,	  Jean-­‐Luc	  Nancy,	  Being	  Singular	  Plural	  (Stanford:	  Stanford	  University	  Press,	  2000).	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implicated	  stories	  dominate	  the	  latter	  stages	  of	  the	  novel,	  are	  unceremoniously	  killed	  in	  the	  last	  chapter,	  with	  the	  novel’s	   final	  scene	  depicting	  the	  assassination	  of	  the	  doctor’s	  wife	  by	  a	  government	  sniper:	  her	  dog	  ‘sniffs	  and	  licks	  his	  mistress’s	  face’	  before	  letting	  out	   ‘a	   terrifying	  howl	  which	  another	  shot	  silences’	   (307).	  This	  howl,	  prefigured	  by	   the	  novel’s	  epigraph	  –	  ‘let’s	  howl,	  said	  the	  dog’	  –	  is	  a	  rallying	  cry	  for	  a	  concerted	  resistance	  to	   the	   violence	   now	   unleashed	   by	   the	   state.	   As	   Wall	   rightly	   points	   out,	   whilst	   the	  reader’s	  final	  attention	  rests	  on	  the	  wife’s	  murder,	  elsewhere	  in	  the	  city	  at	  this	  time	  the	  people	  are	   in	  the	  streets	  and	   ‘are	  now	  beginning	  to	  speak	  once	  more,	   to	  exercise	  their	  sovereign	  power	  to	  decide’.58	  A	  claim	  to	  popular	  sovereignty	  as	  a	  resistance	  to	  the	  state,	  though	  placed	   ‘beyond	  the	  bounds	  of	  the	  novel’59	  is	  surely	  coming.	  As	  the	  novel	  closes,	  we	  leave	  the	  city	  with	  its	  heroes	  dead,	  the	  people	  in	  the	  streets	  and	  a	  demand	  for	  a	  new	  popular	  sovereignty	  able	  to	  resist	  the	  state,	  waiting	  in	  the	  wings.	  In	  this	  sense,	  it	  is	  quite	  right	   to	   read	   the	   devastating	   and	   unremittingly	   bleak	   conclusion	   to	   the	   novel	   as	  revealing	   Saramago’s	   ultimate	   pessimism	   about	   the	   enduring	   force	   of	   the	   gesture	   of	  withdrawal	   that	   animates	   Seeing.	   The	   dog’s	   howl	   is	   a	   call	   for	   a	   return	   to	   speech	   and	  action,	  a	  movement	  from	  withdrawal	  to	  an	  enagagé	  attitude.	  	  	  This	   animal	   ‘howl’,	   however,	   also	  points	   elsewhere,	   indicating	   something	  more	   than	   a	  simplistic	  return	  to	  an	  orthodox	  assertion	  of	  popular	  sovereignty.	  The	  ‘howl’	  touches	  on	  what	   Simone	  Weil	   has	   called	   the	   ‘infallibility’	   of	   the	   ethical	   demand.60It	   is	   an	   affective	  and	  non-­‐representational	  ‘cry’,	  beyond	  the	  cognitive	  and	  linguistic	  that	  is	  the	  condition	  of	  possibility	  of	  the	  juridified	  forms	  that	  a	  claim	  to	  sovereignty	  requires.	  This	  condition	  of	  possibility	  of	  the	  sovereign	  demand	  is	  a	  ‘truth’	  that	  can	  never	  be	  captured	  within	  the	  juridical.	   Like	   the	   affective	   life	   of	   detainees	   under	   interrogation	   and	   the	   ‘collective	  ownership’	   of	   the	   city’s	   dead	   that	   ‘needs	   no	   proof	   anyway’,	   the	   novel’s	   final	   ‘howl’	  foregrounds	   the	   affective	   forces	   that	   precede	   and	   exceed	   the	   closure	   and	  delimitation	  that	  sovereignty	  requires.	  In	  this	  sense,	  Saramago	  ends	  the	  novel	  in	  a	  state	  of	  tension	  or	  aporia:	   he	  both	   affirms	   the	  necessity	   of	   a	   new	  popular	   sovereignty	   that	   can	   resist	   the	  state’s	  unchecked	  violence	  at	   the	  very	  same	   time	  he	  underscores	   the	   infallibility	  of	   an	  affective	  ‘life’	  that	  will	  overflow	  the	  juridical	  determinations	  that	  such	  a	  claim	  requires.	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We	   opened	   this	   discussion	   with	   Hilary	   Mantel’s	   controversial	   description	   of	   Kate	  Middleton’s	   strangely	   bifurcated	   body,	   a	   body	   that	  was	   both	   resolutely	   biological	  and	  symbolic.	   It	   is	   this	   doubled	   life	   that	   Malabou’s	   interventions	   on	   sovereignty	   seek	   to	  challenge.	  Drawing	  on	  recent	  discoveries	  in	  neuroscience	  Malabou	  posit	  a	  singular	  ‘life’	  into	   which	   the	   symbolic	   and	   biological	   division	   collapses.	   In	   Foucault’s	   account	   of	  biopolitics	   it	   is	  the	  biological	  sciences,	  relying	  on	  the	  measurability	  and	  calculability	  of	  the	  human,	  that	  are	  instrumental	  in	  establishing	  the	  binary	  that	  Malabou	  deconstructs.	  A	  reductive	  biological	  ‘life’,	  wholly	  determined	  and	  programmable,	  is	  posited	  onto	  which	  various	  political	  forms,	  like	  so	  many	  designer	  frocks,	  can	  be	  hung.	  Malabou	  argues	  that	  resistance	  to	  this	  account	  of	  life	  can	  be	  found	  within	  the	  biological	  itself	  because	  today’s	  understanding	   of	   biological	   life	   describes	   life	   in	   terms	   of	   ‘plasticity’,	   ‘malleability’	   and	  ‘change’,	  rather	  than	  as	  something	  strictly	  ‘programmed’	  or	  ‘determined’.	  	  	  Notwithstanding	   the	   force	   and	   importance	   of	   Malabou’s	   insights,	   I	   have	   argued	   that	  there	   is	   a	   missing	   element	   from	   her	   ‘plastic	   reading’	   of	   sovereignty.	   By	   avoiding	   any	  meaningful	   engagement	   with	   the	   juridical,	   Malabou	   ignores	   the	   techniques	   that	   both	  produce	  and	  maintain	  the	  very	  division	  between	  symbolic	  and	  biological	  life	  that	  is	  the	  focus	  of	  her	  critique.	  In	  my	  account	  of	  two	  jurisdictional	  technologies	  above,	  the	  force	  of	  law’s	  intervention	  within	  ‘life’	  is	  made	  clear.	  With	  a	  focus	  on	  jurisdiction	  I	  have	  sought	  to	  situate	   juridical	   technique	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   an	   account	   of	   the	   sovereign	   form.	   It	   is	   by	  attending	   to	   the	   jurisdictional	   technologies	   discussed	   above	   that	  we	   can	   describe	   the	  practices	   that	   divide	   ‘life’	   and	   its	   ‘form’,	   thereby	   instantiating	   a	   division	   between	  symbolic	  and	  biological	  lives.	  Through	  a	  reading	  of	  Seeing	  I	  have	  intervened	  within	  this	  logic,	   insisting,	  with	   Saramago,	   that	   the	   affective	   and	  material	   life	   of	   the	   body	   always	  interrupts	   juridical	   determinations.	   Though	   Saramago	   we	   can	   also	   raise	   critical	  questions	  concerning	  the	  supposed	  centrality	  of	  the	  brain	  in	  the	  new	  discourse	  of	   ‘life’	  that	  Malabou’s	  thought	  promises,	  making	  room	  for	  a	  collective	  not	  simply	  cerebral	  life	  in	  this	  context.	  	  	  Let	  me	  return	  briefly	  to	  Mantel	  to	  conclude.	  For	  a	  moment,	  as	  Mantel	  looks	  at	  the	  Queen	  with	  an	  unrelenting	  stare,	  the	  division	  between	  symbolic	  and	  biological	  forms	  of	   life	   is	  lost.	   The	   Queen	   is	   transformed,	   she	   becomes	   young	   again,	   strangely	   vulnerable,	  precarious	   even,	   her	   face	   marked	   by	   ‘hurt	   bewilderment’.	  	   She	   is	   momentarily	  unencumbered	  by	  the	  trappings	  of	  her	  office.	  What	  Mantel	  attunes	  us	  to	  here,	  and	  it	   is	  this	   to	  which	  our	   reading	  of	   Saramago	  has	  hoped	   to	  point,	   is	   the	   truth	  of	   an	  affective,	  material	  and	  precarious	  life	  that	   interrupts	  the	  juridical	  forms	  that	  modernity	  imposes	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on	  its	  unwitting	  subjects.	  As	  Saramago	  reminds	  us,	  we	  are	  always	  already	  bodies	  as	  our	  own	  signs	  despite	  the	  state’s	  best	  efforts	  to	  think	  otherwise.	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